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ABSTRACT
The imperative need for unconditionally secure key exchange is caused by the
increasing connectivity of networks and by the increasing number and level of sophis-
tication of cyberattacks. Two concepts that are information theoretically secured are
quantum key distribution (QKD) and Kirchho-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN). How-
ever, these concepts require a dedicated connection between hosts in peer-to-peer
(P2P) networks which can be impractical and/or cost prohibitive. A practical and
cost eective method is to have each host share their respective cable(s) with other
hosts such that two remote hosts can realize a secure key exchange without the need
of an additional cable or key exchanger.
We introduce a protocol for linear chain networks with a recongurable lter sys-
tem to create non-overlapping single loops in the smart power grid for the realization
of the Kirchho-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise secure key distribution system. The pro-
tocol is valid for one-dimensional daisy chain networks (chain-like power line) which
are typical of the electric distribution network between the utility and the customer.
The speed of the protocol (the number of steps needed) versus grid size is analyzed.
When properly generalized, such a system has the potential to achieve uncondi-
tionally secure key distribution over the smart power grid of arbitrary geometrical
dimensions.
In this work we also analyze the cost complexities of cable, key exchangers, and
time required in the star network. We mention the reliability of the star network
and compare it with other network geometries. We also conceived a protocol and
equation for the number of secure bit exchange periods needed in a star network. We
then outline other network geometries and trade-o possibilities that seem interesting
ii
to explore.
We also propose a new key exchange trust evaluation for peer-to-peer sensor
networks, where part of the network has unconditionally secure key exchange. As
the utilization of sensor networks continues to increase, the importance of security
becomes more profound. Many industries depend on sensor networks for critical
tasks, and a malicious entity can potentially cause catastrophic damage. For a given
sensor, the higher the portion of channels with unconditionally secure key exchange,
the higher the trust value. We give a brief introduction to unconditionally secured
key exchange concepts and mention current trust measures in sensor networks. We
demonstrate the new key exchange trust measure on a hypothetical sensor network
using both wired and wireless communication channels.
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NOMENCLATURE
AC Alternating Current
BE Bit Exchange
CA Certicate Authority
DC Direct Current
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
FCN Fully Connected Network
G Geometric
IoT Internet of Things
KE Key Exchange period
KLJN Kirchho-Law-Johnson-Noise
LCH Linear CHain network
MD5 Message Digest Version 5
MITM Man-In-The-Middle
NSA National Security Agency
P2P Peer-to-Peer
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
QKD Quantum Key Distribution
RR Round Robin
SBEP Secure Bit Exchange Period
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm Version 1
STAR Star network
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1. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION OF SECURE KEY EXCHANGE
FOR UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE KEY EXCHANGE ON SMART
GRIDS1;2;3
1.1 Background
According to the U.S. Code of Laws statute 44 U.S.C. x 3542 (b)(1), information
security is the practice of defending information from unauthorized access, use, dis-
closure, disruption, modication, perusal, inspection, recording, or destruction. In-
formation security is categorized by [86] into areas of data security, network security,
computer security, application security, security operations, and physical security.
Encryption is often used in data security, and key exchange is often used in encryp-
tion [86]. Cryptography is the science of data protection by encryption [90]. To
secure data, Alice (sender) would encrypt the data and transmit it to Bob (receiver).
Bob then has encrypted data and needs to decrypt it to be able to access the data.
To decrypt the data, Bob needs a key (or keys). Alice must securely send Bob the
key so that Bob can decipher the data, in what is known as a secure key exchange.
The key must be sent in a secure method to prevent an eavesdropper (Eve) from
1 Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Information Theoretically Secure, En-
hanced Johnson Noise Based Key Distribution over the Smart Grid with Switched Filters" by
Gonzalez, E., Kish, L.B., Balog, R.S., Prasad, E., (2013). PLoS ONE, 8(7): e70206 Copyright 2013
by PLOS
2 Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Resource Requirements and Speed versus
Geometry of Unconditionally Secure Physical Key Exchanges" by Gonzalez, E., Balog, R.S., Kish,
L.B., (2015). Entropy, 17(4), pp. 2010-2024; DOI:10.3390/e17042010 Copyright 2015 by MDPI
3 Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Key Exchange Trust Evaluation in Peer-
to-Peer Sensor Networks With Unconditionally Secure Key Exchange" by Gonzalez, E., Kish, L.B.,
(2016). A print and electronic version of this article published in Fluctuation and Noise Letters,
Vol. 15, No. 1, 2016, pp. 165008 (17 pages) DOI:10.1142/S0219477516500085 cWorld Scientic
Publishing Company http://www.worldscientic.com/worldscinet/fnl
1
obtaining a copy of the key.
Secure communication channels are needed to prevent eavesdropping or interven-
tion. Increasingly though, communications is directed away from expensive, dedi-
cated networks in favor of the open Internet. In order to ensure secure communi-
cations, security keys are needed to set up a secure communication. The keys are
generated and shared via a publicly accessible channel by secure key distribution
protocols. Consider a secure key exchange between Alice and Bob; Alice and Bob
must consider that an eavesdropper (Eve) is trying to extract the key as illustrated
in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: An illustration of Alice and Bob in a secure key exchange while Eve is
seeking to tap the communication channel and extract the key.
Keys can be either symmetric or asymmetric [24]. Symmetrical keys use the same
key to encrypt and decrypt data, while asymmetrical keys (also known as public key
cryptography) utilizes two keys, where one key is used to encrypt data and another
dierent key is used to decrypt data [24].
Authentication is one of the the most common ways to verify identity. Authen-
tication is the process used to verify an identity, e.g., a username and password is
an example of single-factor authentication [86]. The password is often stored as a
hash, which is an alphanumeric code used to hide passwords. Hash functions are
2
one-way mathematical functions that convert a string of characters to a hash, often
used to store passwords and as digital signatures. In theory, hash functions cannot
be reversed, unlike encryption methods. Examples of hash functions are Secure Hash
Algorithm Version 1 (SHA-1) and Message Digest Version 5 (MD5) [86]. Certicate-
based authentication often utilizes information that binds an identity to a public key
and a digital signature of the issuing authority known as the Certicate Authority
(CA) [86]. Certicates are supported by a governing hierarchical body authorized to
distribute certicates, and many certicate infrastructure organizations are known
as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [86]. Modern secure key exchange requires au-
thentication before keys are exchanged. Secure key exchanges can be categorized as
either software-based or hardware-based.
1.2 Software-Based Key Exchange
In software-based key distribution (exchange) protocols, the security is only
computationally-conditional, meaning that the eavesdropper has all the communi-
cated information, and with enough computing resources or time, the key can be
fully extracted. The advantage of software-based key distributions is that they are
relatively cheap, easy to install and run, and the key can be exchanged wirelessly.
Software-based key exchanges are based on mathematical algorithms with the
assumption that Eve does not have enough computing resources to crack the key.
In essence, software-based key exchanges oer no security from an information the-
oretical point of view. The security is only (computationally-) conditional and is
not future-proof, meaning that with enough computing resources the key can be ex-
tracted. The advantages of software-based key exchanges are the low cost, hardware
communicator is not required, and the keys can be exchanged over the Internet, thus
eliminating the need of additional infrastructure. The other option is hardware-based
3
key exchange, which oers an advantage of unconditional security.
1.3 Unconditionally Secure Key Exchange
Unconditionally secure key exchanges are key distribution methods that are in-
formation theoretically secure [63], which means that the information is not in the
communicated signal, see next section. Thus even with innite computing resources
the eavesdropper cannot extract the key. However, physical (hardware-based) key ex-
changes are the only schemes that can provide unconditionally secure key exchange.
Hardware-based key exchanges are more expensive than software-based schemes;
moreover, wireless key exchange is not possible (except quantum key distribution
with single photons, which require complete darkness.)
1.4 Hardware-Based Secure Key Exchanges
So far there are two physical key distribution classes that oer unconditionally
secure key exchange: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [8] and the Kirchho-Law-
Johnson-Noise (KLJN) scheme [49, 47, 77, 78, 59, 82, 58, 50, 53, 54, 51, 27, 79, 16,
18, 52, 57, 56, 48, 55, 17].
The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and the Kirchho-Law-Johnson-Noise
(KLJN) secure key exchange, are two examples of hardware-based secure key ex-
change concepts that are information theoretically secure [63]. Thus, even with
innite computing resources the key will not be extracted by Eve, because the se-
curity oered by these schemes is based on fundamental laws of physics; to crack
the key exchange would require Eve to break the underpinning laws of physics. The
main disadvantage of hardware-based key exchanges is the higher cost, as they re-
quire a physical communicator at each host and a dedicated connection between
communicators. Such communication schemes can be considered peer-to-peer (P2P)
[91].
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1.5 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
The QKD key exchange utilizes the quantum no-cloning theorem of quantum
mechanics [8] to distribute key bits. In theory it is information theoretically secure;
however, the physical implementation of QKD has been debated and the method has
been hacked [100, 25, 67, 73].
In QKD principle, the bits are exchanged via single photon communications and
the physical laws of physics, which provide unconditional secure key exchange by
the quantum no-cloning theorem [8]. Recently, the fundamental security proofs for
QKD have been debated [100, 101, 36]. QKD has also had issues with the non-
ideality of practical building elements, which has lead to the cracking of existing
communicators, including commercial devices [36, 71, 26, 74, 98, 72, 40, 69, 66,
68]. Although these practical non-ideality problems can be patched, QKD remains
vulnerable until the patch is known and applied. Other concerns with QKD systems
are the bulky physical size, relative expense, large power consumption, sensitivity to
vibrations, and requirement of a \dark optical ber." These characteristics of QKD
make it almost impossible to integrate into a sensor.
1.6 Kirchho-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN)
In the KLJN scheme, the key bit is exchanged via a wired channel and utilizes
statistical physics [49]. The actual physical laws of providing security are the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics and the properties of Gaussian uctuations. Relative
to QKD, KLJN can be integrated on a microchip; thus it does not have issues with
physical size, energy required, sensitivity to vibrations, etc. KLJN can be imple-
mented into a sensor, but it will require a wire to connect every sensor that intends
to acquire an unconditionally secure key exchange.
An illustration of the KLJN setup is in Figure 1.2. In this gure, Alice and
5
Bob have two identical resistor pairs which are RL for the Low resistor and RH for
the High resistor. Each resistor has noise voltages that are enhanced by Johnson
noise; UA;L for Alice's Low resistor, UA;H for Alice's High resistor, UB;L for Bob's Low
resistor, and UB;H for Bob's High resistor. During the key bit exchange period the
rst step is for Alice and Bob to select either RL or RH. The selection of RL and RH
is random and both are equally likely to be selected. Since the selection of RL and
RH is random, neither Alice or Bob know which resistor will be selected. Once Alice
and Bob select their respective resistor, they measure the voltage and/or current in
the wire. The channel voltage can be modeled by < U2ch(t) >= 4kTeRloopBKLJN
and the channel current can be modeled by < I2ch(t) >= 4kTeBKLJN=Rloop with k
being Boltzmann's constant, Te measuring the eective temperature, Rloop being
the loop resistance, and BKLJN being the KLJN bandwidth [49]. From < U
2
ch(t) >
or < I2ch(t) >, Alice and Bob know which resistor the other end selected, and they
already know which resistor they selected. If the voltage noise level is high, then
they both selected high resistors and if the voltage noise level is low, then they both
selected low resistors; in these outcomes the key bit is discarded and the next period
begins. If an intermediate voltage noise level or current noise level is measured,
then a secure key bit is generated, stored, and the next period begins. This process
continues until the desired number of key bits are generated.
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Figure 1.2: An illustration of the core KLJN system. Alice and Bob each have a
communicator which have noise generators, a \Low" resistor RL (representing the
Low bit value), and a \High" resistor RH (representing the High bit value.) The
noise voltages are enhanced by generators emulating Johnson noise, UA;L or UA;H for
Alice: and UB;L or UB;H for Bob, at very high temperature. Once the communicators
select a resistor they measure the mean-squared voltage amplitude < U2ch(t) > and/or
the current amplitude < I2ch(t) >. There is a wire for the key exchange, and there
is a channel for data exchange. Against active attacks and attacks exploiting ratio
non-idealities, an authenticated public data channel is used to measure and compare
bits [47, 54].
The core system in Figure 1.2 is secure against passive (non-invasive) attacks in
the idealized case. However in [47, 54], when Eve is tampering with or changing the
system via an active (invasive) intervention, such as launching a MITM (man-in-the-
middle) attack [47], the core system is not enough to guarantee security. Similarly,
non-idealities, which represent deviations from the original scheme, cause information
leak [54]. For defending the system against these kind of attacks, the instantaneous
voltage and current amplitudes are measured by Alice and Bob, and these quantities
are communicated and compared via a public authenticated data channel. Alice
and Bob have a full and deterministic model of the system; because it is a classical
physical system, incessant measurement of the current and voltage is allowed. Based
on their comparison and preconditions, Alice and Bob decide to keep or discard
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the compromised bit [47]. The authentication uses only log2(M) secure bits of the
exchanged bits, where M is the number of bits carrying the current and voltage data
in the public channel. In practical applications, this channel can be wireless or wired.
1.7 Applying KLJN to Smart Grid Networks
The smart grid consists of several geometric topologies such as linear chain net-
works, star networks, and other networks. Some networks are wireless and thus
KLJN cannot be utilized in these situations. To realize KLJN, we propose the use
of switched lters and/or install an additional cable to send KLJN bandwidth. We
want to minimize cost complexities of the required cables, key exchangers, and time.
To minimize cost, we propose protocols that take advantage of network topologies.
For wireless networks, we propose the use of a key exchange trust evaluation that
gives a higher trust evaluation to sensors or networks with KLJN key exchange and
lower evaluations to sensors or networks without KLJN exchange. We discuss and
analyze these ideas in the following chapters.
8
2. UTILIZING SWITCHED FILTERS ON THE SMART GRID TO REALIZE
UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE KEY EXCHANGE OVER LINEAR CHAIN
NETWORKS1
2.1 Motivation
2.1.1 KLJN, the Information Theoretically Secure Wire-Based Key Exchange
Scheme
On February 12, 2013, President Obama issued an executive order to outline
policies directing companies and operators of vital infrastructure, such as power grids,
to set standards for cybersecurity [23]. This step is an indication of the urgent need
to protect intelligence, companies, infrastructure, and personal data in an ecient
method. In this chapter, we propose a solution that provides information theoretic
(that is, unconditional) secure key exchange over the smart grid. This method is
controlled by lters and protects against MITM attacks.
A smart grid [5, 44] is an electrical power distribution network that uses infor-
mation and communications technology to improve the security [75, 60], reliability,
eciency, and sustainability of the production and distribution of electricity. A form
of a cyber-physical system, the smart grid enables greater eciency through a higher
degree of awareness and control, but also introduces new failure modes associated
with data being intercepted and compromised.
Private key based secure communications require a shared secret key between
1 Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Information Theoretically Secure, En-
hanced Johnson Noise Based Key Distribution over the Smart Grid with Switched Filters" by
Gonzalez, E., Kish, L.B., Balog, R.S., Prasad, E., (2013). PLoS ONE, 8(7): e70206 Copyright 2013
by PLOS
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Alice and Bob who may communicate over remote distances. In today's secure
communications, sharing such a key also utilizes electronic communications because
courier and mail services are slow. However, the software-based key distribution
methods oer only limited security levels that are only computationally-conditional;
thus, they are not future-proof. By having suciently enhanced computing power,
Eve can crack the key and all communications that are using that key. Therefore,
unconditional security (indicating that the security holds even under innite com-
putational power), which is the popular wording of the term \information theoretic
security" [63], requires more than a software solution. It needs the utilization of the
proper laws of physics.
The oldest scheme that claims information theoretic security by utilizing the laws
of physics is quantum key distribution (QKD). While the security available in QKD
schemes has been debated and compromised [100, 25, 71, 26, 74, 98, 72, 40, 69,
66, 68, 89, 67, 70, 73], the discussions indicate that there is a potential to reach a
satisfactory security level in the future, though it may require a new approach [100].
However, current QKD devices are prohibitively expensive and have other practical
limitations, such as they are sensitive to vibrations, bulky, limited in range, and
require a special \dark optical ber" cable with sophisticated infrastructure.
On the other hand, the smart grid oers a unique way to process a secure key ex-
change because each household (host) in the grid is electrically connected. To utilize
a wire connection for secure key exchange, a dierent set of the laws of physics (not
the laws applied for QKD that work with optical bers) must be utilized. Recently
a classical statistical physical alternative to QKD, the Kirchho-Law-Johnson-(like)-
Noise (KLJN) key exchange system has been proposed [49, 47, 77, 78, 59, 82, 58],
which is a wired-based scheme that is free from several limitations of QKD. A recent
survey is given in [77]. Similar to QKD, KLJN is also an information theoretically
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secure key distribution [77]. However, it is robust, not sensitive to vibrations, has
unlimited range [78], can be integrated on chips [59], can use existing wire infras-
tructure such as power lines [82], and KLJN based networks can also be constructed
[58].
The KLJN channel is a semiconducting wire [77]. At the beginning of each clock
cycle (note, the 50 Hz/60 Hz AC grid provides a universal time synchronization),
Alice and Bob, who have an identical pair of resistors RL and RH (representing the
0 and 1 bit situations) randomly select and connect one of the resistors, as shown in
Figure 1.2. In practical applications, voltage noise generators enhance the Johnson
noise of the resistors so that all resistors in the system have the same, publicly known
eective noise-temperature Te (where Te  109 Kelvin). The enhanced Johnson
noise voltages fUL;A(t) or UH;A(t); and UL;B(t) or UH;B(t)g of the resistor result in a
channel noise voltage between the wire and the ground, and a channel noise current,
Ich(t), in the wire. Low-pass lters are used because the noise-bandwidth, which
we also call KLJN-band Bkljn (its value depends on the range), must be chosen so
that wave, reection, and propagation and delay eects are negligible, otherwise
the security is compromised [49]. Alice and Bob can measure the mean-squared
amplitudes < U2ch(t) > and/or < I
2
ch(t) > within the KLJN-band in the line. From
any of these values, the loop resistance can be calculated [49] by using the Johnson
noise equations (2.1), with the noise-bandwidth Bkljn, eective temperature Te , loop
resistance Rloop, and Boltzmann's constant k:
< U2ch(t) >= 4kTeRloopBkljn
< I2ch(t) >=
4kTeBkljn
Rloop
:
(2.1)
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Alice and Bob know their own choice resistor; thus, from the loop resistance they
can deduce the resistance value and the actual bit status at the other end of the wire.
In an ideal situation, the cases RLjRH and RHjRL represent a secure bit exchange
event because they cannot be distinguished by the measured mean squared values.
Eve can do the very same measurements, but she has no knowledge about any of the
resistance selections by Alice and Bob and thus she is unable to extract the key bits
from the measured loop resistance.
The KLJN protocol can also be applied to several other wired networks such as
electronic equipment that do not desire to be reverse engineered. However, in this
chapter we focus on applying the KLJN protocol on the smart grid.
2.1.2 Utilizing the Smart Power Grid for Information Theoretic Secure Key
Exchange
The disadvantage of the KLJN key exchange protocol is that it requires a wired
connection. Investors are hesitant to cover the cost of additional infrastructure solely
for the purpose of security. On the other hand, virtually every building in the civilized
world is connected to the electrical power grid. This fact is very motivating to explore
the possibility of using the power grid as the infrastructure for the KLJN protocol.
However, only the single loop shown in Figure 1.2 is unconditionally secure. When
Alice and Bob are two remote hosts in the smart grid, they should indeed experience
a single loop connection as in Figure 1.2. Thus for smart grid applications, proper
lters must be installed and controlled for the KLJN frequency band to operate.
Though simple examples have been outlined to prove that a KLJN key exchange
between two remote points in a radial power grid with lters [82, 58] can be achieved,
neither details about the structure of the lter units nor network protocols to connect
every host on the grid with all other hosts has been shown. The method described
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in [58] is high speed, because if the units do simultaneous key exchange they have
a joint network key, and the units must trust each other. In the present system the
units have independent keys.
The present chapter aims to make the rst steps in this direction by presenting
a working scheme with scaling analysis of the speed of key exchange versus network
size. We limit our network to a one-dimensional linear chain network to utilize the
smart power grid for KLJN secure key exchange. We show and analyze a protocol
to eciently supply every host with proper secure keys so that they can separately
communicate with all the other hosts.
2.2 Discussions and Results
Because the pattern of connections between KLJN units must be varied to provide
the exchange of a separate secure key for each possible pair of hosts, the network
of lters and their connections must be varied accordingly. The power line lter
technology is already available [6, 45] and we will show that the required results can
be achieved by switching on/o proper ltering units in a structured way on the
smart grid. We will need lters to pass or reject the KLJN frequency band, Bkljn,
and/or the power frequency, fp (50 or 60 Hz). When both Bkljn and fp are passed,
it is a short; and when both are rejected, it is a break. We will call these lters
switched lters.
2.2.1 Switched Filters
We call the functional units connected to the smart power grid hosts. A host
is able to execute a KLJN key exchange toward its left and right in a simultaneous
manner. That means each host has two independent KLJN units. The lter system
must satisfy the following requirements:
(i) Hosts that currently do not execute KLJN key exchange should not interfere
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with those processes, even if the KLJN signals passes through their connections.
(ii) Each host should be able to extract electrical power from the electric power
system without disturbing the KLJN key exchanges.
We dene the size of a network as being of size N when that network has N + 1
hosts. An example of a network of size N = 7 is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Example of a one-dimensional grid, we call it a chain network. This
example has a network of size N = 7.
Intermediate hosts on the network can be in two dierent states according to the
need:
() State 1 is dened when KLJN bandwidth (Bkljn) is not allowed into the host.
() State 2 is dened when KLJN bandwidth (Bkljn) is allowed into the host.
Hosts at the two ends can be in similar situations except that they can communi-
cate in only a single direction; thus they are special, limited cases of the intermediate
hosts to which we are focusing our considerations when discussing lters.
Filter boxes at each host will distribute the KLJN signals and the power, and
they are responsible for connecting the proper parties for a KLJN key exchange and
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to supply hosts with power, see Figure 2.2. The lters boxes can be controlled either
by a central server and/or an automatic algorithm. In the following section, we
discuss the protocol of this control. Each lter box has three switched lters and a
corresponding output wire, see Figure 2.2:
Figure 2.2: Building blocks in a lter box.
(a) The Left KLJN Filter for the KLJN key exchange toward left,
(b) The Right KLJN Filter for the KLJN key exchange toward right.
(c) The Power Filter to supply power to the host.
The properly controlled lter boxes will provide non-overlapping KLJN loops be-
tween the hosts, see below. KLJN loops need to be non-overlapping loops because
the KLJN protocol is fundamentally P2P. If overlapping loops were allowed, then
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there is a possibility that Eve might be in between and will require the trust of the
intermediate hosts. A problem with P2P networks is that they require direct connec-
tions. QKD also require direct connections. The reason for having two KLJN units
per host is to decrease the time needed to connect every host by having simultaneous
loops toward left and right, without overlapping. Figure 2.3 shows an example for
N = 7. The solid black line means that both KLJN bandwidth and power frequency
is passing through (ordinary wire: the original line). The (red) dotted lines carry
Bkljn (fp is rejected). The (blue) dashed lines indicate the opposite situation: only
the power frequency is passing and the KLJN bandwidth is rejected.
Figure 2.3: Example for network of size N = 7. Each host is connected to a lter
box and the lters boxes are connected to the power grid. Note how each host has
three wire connections to its lter box.
When there is a key exchange between the rst host (host 0) and the last host
(host 7) over the whole network (Figure 2.3), then all hosts in between (host 1
through host 6) are not allowed to access the KLJN band. In this state, the lter
boxes of host 1 through 6 must separate their respective host from the KLJN band,
and at the same time supply them power. We call this working mode of the lter
boxes of non-active hosts State 1. The wiring and frequency transfer of the Filter
Box in State 1 are shown in Figure 2.4 and Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
16
Figure 2.4: The lter box of the inactive host (when a host is not executing a KLJN
key exchange): State 1. Everything (Bkljn and fp) is passing between the left and
right lters, and the host can only access power. Filter A is passing everything
(shorted). Filter B is disconnected. Filter C is passing Bkljn only. Filters E and D
are passing fp only. State 1 is when the host is not allowed to access the KLJN band.
State 2 is when the host is allowed to access the KLJN band. This lter box is in
State 1.
State 1 (inactive host) KLJN Filters Filter A Filter B
KLJN Bkljn Allowed? Yes No
Power Frequency fp Allowed? Yes No
Table 2.1: Truth table of the KLJN Filters in State 1 (inactive host).
State 1 (inactive host) Power Filters Filter C Filter D Filter E
KLJN Bkljn Allowed? Yes No No
Power Frequency fp Allowed? No Yes Yes
Table 2.2: Truth table of the Power Filters in State 1 (inactive host).
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See Figures 2.5 and 2.6, as additional examples of seven key exchanges occurring
simultaneously with every host in that network being active (allowed access to the
KLJN band). The KLJN lters of these hosts must separate the KLJN loops by
preventing Bkljn from entering Filter A. We call this working mode State 2 with the
lter boxes executing key exchanges. The wiring and frequency transfer of the Filter
Box in State 2 are shown in Figure 2.5 and Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
Figure 2.5: The lter box of the active host (when a host is executing a KLJN
key exchange): State 2. Power is passing between the left and right lters, but the
KLJN band is not. The left and right KLJN units are separated while executing a
key exchange with hosts towards its left and right side. State 1 is when a host is not
allowed to access the KLJN band. State 2 is when a host is allowed to access the
KLJN band. This lter box is in State 2.
State 2 (active host) KLJN Filters Filter A Filter B
KLJN Bkljn Allowed? No Yes
Power Frequency fp Allowed? Yes No
Table 2.3: Truth table of the KLJN Filters in State 2 (active host).
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State 2 (active host) Power Filters Filter D Filter E Filter F
KLJN Bkljn Allowed? No No No
Power Frequency fp Allowed? No Yes Yes
Table 2.4: Truth table of the Power Filters in State 2 (active host).
In this section we have shown that the line can be packed with non-overlapping
KLJN loops to execute simultaneous key exchanges between selected hosts. In the
next section, we propose a network protocol to provide secure keys for each host so
that they will be able to communicate securely via the Internet or other publicly
accessible channels between arbitrary pairs of hosts. The time requirement for a key
exchange over the entire network versus a network of size N will be analyzed.
2.2.2 Protocol and Speed
To quickly and eciently connect every host with all other hosts in the same
one-dimensional networks we need to establish a protocol. The protocol must make
every possible connection in the network, must not overlap loops, and must be quick
and ecient by making as many simultaneous loops without overlapping as possible.
To determine the time and speed requirements to establish a KLJN secure key
exchange we must rst dene terms. In the classical KLJN system, where only the
noise exist in the wire, the low-frequency cuto of the noise was 0 Hz and the high-
frequency cuto was Bkljn. In the case of KLJN on the smart grid, this situation will
be dierent because of the power frequency. However, at short distances (less than
10 miles), the Bkljn band can be beyond the power frequency (fp) and the dierence
is negligible. Thus the shortest characteristic time in the system is the correlation
time kljn of the noise (kljn  1=Bkljn). Bkljn is determined by the distance L between
Alice and Bob so that Bkljn << c=L [73]; (for example, Bkljn << 100 kHz for L = 1
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kilometer). Alice and Bob must make a statistic on the noise, which typically requires
around 100  kljn duration [78] (or 0.01 seconds if we use Bkljn = 10 kHz) to have
a suciently high delity. Note, faster performance is expected in advanced KLJN
methods [50]. A bit exchange (BE) occurs when Alice and Bob have dierent resistor
values; this occurs on average of 200  kljn or 0.02 seconds if Bkljn = 10 kHz. The
length of the secure key exchange can be any arbitrary length. For example, if
we have a key length of 100 bits then we need 100 BE, which requires on average
20000  kljn, which is approximately 2 seconds if Bkljn is 10 kHz. Once the KLJN
secure key has been exchanged, the total amount of time needed to complete this
is one KLJN secure key Exchange period (KE). While the key exchange is slow,
the system has the advantage that it is running continuously (not only during the
handshake period as some common secure Internet protocols require) and thus a
large number of secure key bits are produced during the continuous operation.
For the sake of simplicity, we use a pessimistic estimation by assuming a uniform
duration for KE determined by the largest distance in the network, even though
short distances can exchange keys at a higher speed.
The protocol we propose here rst connects the nearest neighbor of every host;
this allows the highest number of simultaneous, non-overlapping loops per KE and
only requires one KE to complete this rst step. The protocol then connects the
second nearest neighbors, which allows the second highest numbers of simultaneous
loops per KE. However, due to the requirement of avoiding overlapping loops, con-
necting each pair of second nearest neighbors requires two KEs. The protocol then
connects the third nearest neighbors, which require 3 KEs to complete, and connects
the third most simultaneous loops per KE. This procedure continues until the ith
nearest neighbor is equal to or less than half of the size of the network. If the number
of steps i between the ith nearest neighbors satises the relation i > N=2, then to
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avoid overlapping loops only one connection per KE is possible.
As an example, we will show in the next section that for N = 7 (see Figure 2.1),
16 KEs (approximately 32 seconds if Bkljn is 10 kHz) are required when the keys are
100 bits long. Using this protocol, the analytical form of the exact time required to
fully secure every host with enough keys so that they can securely communicate with
every other host on the network is dependent on the size of the network and whether
the network has an even or odd size. In the following sections we will deduce the
analytical relations and show examples.
2.2.2.1 If N is Odd for a Network of Size N
We illustrate the steps the protocol takes and calculate the time requirements
with an example shown in the following gures. A general formula for an arbitrary
size network when N is odd is given later. In this example we have a network of
size N = 7. We have 8 hosts with index i (0  i  7). We have 7 intermediate
connections between the rst and last host.
The rst step in the protocol connects the nearest neighbors, see Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: The rst step in the protocol connects the nearest neighbors. This step is
the quickest and most ecient. It has the most non-overlapping simultaneous loops
and requires only 1 KE to complete. Every host in this step has access to the KLJN
band and thus are in State 2.
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The second step in the protocol will then connect the second nearest neighbors,
see Figure 2.7. This step is the second quickest and the second most ecient. It has
the second most non-overlapping simultaneous loops and requires 2 KEs to complete.
Figure 2.7: The second step in the protocol connects the second nearest neighbors.
This step is the second quickest and the second most ecient. It has the second
most non-overlapping simultaneous loops and requires 2 KEs to complete.
The protocol will then connect the third closest neighbors as shown in Figure 2.8.
This will take 3 KEs to complete and is not as ecient as the rst two steps in the
protocol but still has simultaneous loops in two of its KE steps.
22
Figure 2.8: The third step in the protocol connects the third nearest neighbors. This
step is not as ecient as the rst two steps but still has simultaneous loops. This
step requires 3 KEs to complete.
The protocol will then connect the fourth nearest neighbors as shown in Fig-
ure 2.9. This is above the midpoint for our example with N = 7 and is the slowest
and least ecient step in the protocol. The midpoint is considered when the distance
between Alice and Bob is equal to half the length of the network. These steps will
take 4 KEs to complete. Simultaneous loops with disconnected hosts are no longer
possible beyond the midpoint (according to our protocol). The slowest and least
ecient steps occur at the midpoint of the protocol.
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Figure 2.9: The fourth step in the protocol connects the fourth nearest neighbors.
This step is the slowest and least ecient step in the protocol in our example of
N = 7. This step requires 4 KEs to complete.
The protocol will then connect the fth nearest neighbors as shown in Figure 2.10.
This step will take 3 KEs to complete. It is also inecient since it is beyond the
midpoint thus only a single loop is possible, but it requires fewer KEs since there are
only three such pairs.
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Figure 2.10: The fth step in the protocol connects the fth nearest neighbors. This
step is not ecient since simultaneous non-overlapping loops with disconnected hosts
cannot occur.
The protocol will then connect the sixth nearest neighbors as shown in Fig-
ure 2.11. This step will take 2 KEs because there are only two possibilities.
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Figure 2.11: The sixth step in the protocol connects the sixth nearest neighbors.
This step requires only 2 KEs since there are only two possibilities.
The protocol will then connect the seventh closest neighbors as shown in Fig-
ure 2.12. This will take 1 KE since there is only one such pair of hosts. Host 1
through 6 are not allowed access to the KLJN band thus they are in State 1. This
is the seventh and the last step. This step is not ecient.
Figure 2.12: Only one key exchange is performed in this step. Host 1 through 6 are
not allowed access to the KLJN band thus they are in State 1. This is the seventh
and the last step. This step is not ecient but only requires one KE since there is
only one such pair of hosts.
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This completes the protocol for an example of size N = 7. Notice the pattern
that occurs for N being odd. We have a pattern of 1 KE, 2 KE, 3 KE, 4 KE, 3 KE,
2 KE, and 1 KE. This is essentially Gauss's counting technique up to N=2 and back.
The total number of KEs needed will be 1 KE + 2 KE + 3 KE + 4 KE + 3 KE +
2 KE + 1 KE = 16 KE.
The speed or time requirement of the protocol for a network of arbitrary size N
with N being odd is
 
N+1
2
2
KEs and can be derived as follows.
Since N is odd we can express it as equation (2.2):
N = 2n+ 1: (2.2)
To nd the midpoint we can solve for n and express it in terms of N ; this gives the
following equation (2.3):
N   1
2
= n: (2.3)
The pattern when N is odd has the following form given by equation (2.4):
1 + 2 +   + (n  1) + n+ (n  1) +   + 2 + 1 =

N   1
2
2
: (2.4)
Expressing n in terms of N gives equation (2.5):
1+2+  +

N   1
2
 1

+

N   1
2

+

N   1
2
 1

+  +2+1 =

N   1
2
2
: (2.5)
We know from Gauss's counting method that
1 + 2 +   +N = N(N + 1)
2
:
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In our pattern we can use Gauss's counting method twice to nd the sum as follows
in equation (2.6):
1 + 2 +   +

N   1
2
  1

| {z } 
N 1
2  1
 
N 1
2

2
+

N   1
2

+

N   1
2
  1

+   + 2 + 1| {z } 
N 1
2  1
 
N 1
2

2
=

N   1
2
2
:
(2.6)
Equation (2.6) simplies to equation (2.7), given below:
 
N 1
2
  1 N 1
2

2
+

N   1
2

+
 
N 1
2
  1 N 1
2

2
=

N   1
2
2
: (2.7)
Thus the speed of the network is proportional to N2=4 with N being the number of
hosts in the network and odd numbered. The pattern for when N is even is similar.
2.2.2.2 If N is Even for a Network of Size N
For the sake of completeness and for those without a communications background,
we will again illustrate the steps the protocol takes and calculate the time require-
ments with an example shown in the following gures. In this case, we have an even
number as the network size is N = 8. We have 9 hosts with index i (0  i  8). We
have 8 intermediate connections between the rst and last host.
The rst step in the protocol connects the nearest neighbors. This step is the
quickest and most ecient. It has the most simultaneous non-overlapping loops
and requires only one KE to complete. Figure 2.13 illustrates this rst step in the
protocol.
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Figure 2.13: The rst step in the protocol connects the nearest neighbors. This step
is the quickest and most ecient. It has the most non-overlapping simultaneous
loops and requires only 1 KE to complete.
The second step in the protocol will then connect the second nearest neighbors
as shown in Figure 2.14. This step will take two KEs to complete and has the second
most simultaneous non-overlapping loops. It is the second quickest and second most
ecient step.
Figure 2.14: The second step in the protocol connects the second nearest neighbors.
This step requires 2 KEs to complete.
The protocol will then connect the third nearest neighbors as shown in Fig-
ure 2.15. This will take 3 KEs to complete and is not as ecient as the rst two
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steps in the protocol but still has simultaneous loops in this example with N = 8.
Figure 2.15: The third step in the protocol connects the third nearest neighbors.
This step requires 3 KEs to complete.
The protocol will then connect the fourth nearest neighbors as shown in Fig-
ure 2.16. This is at the midpoint for our example with N = 8 and is the slowest
and least ecient step in the protocol. The midpoint is dened when the distance
between Alice and Bob is equal to half the length of the network. This step will take
4 KEs to complete. The slowest and least ecient steps occur at the midpoint of the
protocol.
30
Figure 2.16: The fourth step in the protocol connects the fourth nearest neighbors.
It requires 4 KEs to complete.
The protocol will then connect the fth nearest neighbors as shown in Figure 2.17.
This step will take 4 KEs to complete. It is not ecient since it is at the midpoint.
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Figure 2.17: The fth step in the protocol connects the fth nearest neighbors. This
step is not ecient since simultaneous non-overlapping loops with disconnected hosts
cannot occur. It requires 4 KEs to complete.
The protocol will then connect the sixth nearest neighbors as shown in Fig-
ure 2.18. This step will take 3 KEs because there are only three possibilities at this
distance in this example network of size N = 8.
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Figure 2.18: The sixth step in the protocol connects the sixth nearest neighbors.
This step requires only 3 KEs since it is the third to last step and there are only
three possibilities.
The protocol will then connect the seventh nearest neighbors as shown in Fig-
ure 2.19. This will take 2 KEs since there are only two pairs of hosts with a length
of seven hosts between them.
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Figure 2.19: The seventh step in this example network of size N = 8. This step is
not ecient but only requires two KEs since there are only two such pairs of hosts.
The last step in the protocol connects the rst and last hosts. This step is the
least ecient and requires the entire length of the network. Since there is only one
pair of hosts at this length this step requires only one KE. This last step is illustrated
in Figure 2.20.
Figure 2.20: The last step in the protocol connects the rst and last hosts. This step
is the least ecient and requires the entire length of the network. Since there is only
one pair of hosts at this length this step requires only one KE.
Notice the pattern that occurs for N being even. We have 1 KE, 2 KE, 3 KE, 4
KE, 4 KE, 3 KE, 2 KE, and 1 KE. This is essentially Gauss's counting technique up
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to N=2 and back. The total number of KEs needed will be 1 KE + 2 KE + 3 KE +
4 KE + 4 KE + 3 KE + 2 KE + 1 KE = 20 KE. The time needed to connect the
entire network will take 20 KEs which is approximately 40 seconds if Bkljn is 10 kHz
and if the key is 100 bits long.
The speed or time requirement of the protocol for a network of size N with N
being even is
 
N2=4 +N=2

KEs and can be derived as follows.
With N = 8 the number of KEs needed is 20, according to equation (2.8):
N2
4
+
N
2
= 20: (2.8)
Since N is even we can express it as equation (2.9):
N = 2n: (2.9)
To nd the midpoint we can solve n and express it in terms of N ; this gives equa-
tion (2.10):
N
2
= n: (2.10)
The general pattern when N is even has the following form given in equation (2.11):
1 + 2 +   + n+ n+   + 2 + 1 = N
2
4
+
N
2
: (2.11)
Expressing n in terms of N gives equation (2.12):
1 + 2 +   + N
2
+
N
2
+   + 2 + 1 = N
2
4
+
N
2
: (2.12)
We know from Gauss's counting method that
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1 + 2 +   +N = N(N + 1)
2
:
In our pattern we can use Gauss's counting method twice to nd the sum as follows
given by equations (2.13) and (2.14):
1 + 2 +   + N
2| {z } 
N
2
 
N
2 +1

2
+
N
2
+   + 2 + 1| {z } 
N
2
 
N
2 +1

2
=
N2
4
+
N
2
; (2.13)
N
2
 
N
2
+ 1

2
+
N
2
 
N
2
+ 1

2
=
N2
4
+
N
2
: (2.14)
Equation (2.14) simplies to equation (2.15):

N
2

N
2
+ 1

=
N2
4
+
N
2
: (2.15)
Thus the speed of the network is proportional to N2=4 with N being the number of
hosts on the network, and with N being even.
2.3 Limitations of Realizing KLJN over the Smart Grid, Open Questions, and
Future Work
To fully implement the KLJN key exchange protocol over the smart grid will
require solutions to further engineering problems. This chapter presents results of
our early work, which focuses on the system-concept in a one-dimensional network.
Some of the limitations, open questions, and future work are discussed below.
2.3.1 Limitations
The main limitation of the KLJN protocol is that it is a P2P network. This
will limit the number of simultaneous KLJN key exchanges a host can have. Since
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overlapping loops are not allowed, the time required scales quadratically with the
number of hosts in a linear chain network. Another limit is that the KLJN band-
width is dependent on the distance between Alice and Bob and slows down for longer
distances. These limitations make it impractical to connect millions of hosts via a
linear chain network, and thus other topologies (and perhaps bridges, routers, or re-
peaters) will be needed to connect such chains with each other. Practical limitations
in the power system, such as tap changing transformers and other devices may also
require bridges to couple the KLJN signal around these devices.
2.3.2 Open Questions
The related technical challenges need to be further researched. For example,
distribution transformers can shield most of the signals sent from one phase on the
load side; this will present a problem, but there are many ways to get around it and
accurately transmit the KLJN band. We did not investigate the problems of phase-
correcting inductors and capacitors since they are separated by the power lters
from the KLJN band. Research and development will be needed for some of these
problems including how to setup lters in each node. Accuracies are typically within
a few percentage points. In the experimental demo, the cable resistance was 2% of
total loop resistance. In practice, the impedance of the power grid would need to be
taken into account.
2.3.3 Future Work
Future work will, among others, include protocols for several other power grid
topologies. Setting up lters on the power grid and implementing all the lters will
also need to be further researched. Penetration hacking attacks against lters and
defensively securing the lters are also interesting open problems.
In the next chapter we will analyze the star network and compare its cost com-
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plexities and robustness with linear chain networks and fully connected networks.
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3. A PROTOCOL FOR IMPLEMENTING UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE
KEY EXCHANGE ON A STAR NETWORK IN THE SMART GRID AND
COMPARING COST COMPLEXITIES AND ROBUSTNESS WITH
DIFFERENT NETWORK TOPOLOGIES2
3.1 Securing Networks
3.1.1 Motivation for a Secure Network
In the advent of intelligent vehicle information networks [11], the smart power
grid [5], and the Internet of Things (IoT ) [94], current infrastructure is becoming
increasingly dependent on cyber networks. This dependency makes current infras-
tructure a larger, more attractive target for cyberattacks, such that the National
Security Agency (NSA) director stated the U.S. power grid could be shut down with
a cyberattack [1].
3.1.2 Secure Key Exchange over P2P Networks and the Fully Connected Network
Hardware-based key exchanges require P2P networks with a dedicated connection
to each host. For very large networks this will be costly due to the infrastructure
(cables) and key exchangers. The cost complexity of the growth for dierent networks
can be denoted by Tcable(N) for the number of cables needed, Tke(N) for the number
of key exchangers needed, and Ttime(N) for the amount of time required or speed
to complete a secure bit exchange, with N representing the number of hosts on the
network.
2 Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Resource Requirements and Speed versus
Geometry of Unconditionally Secure Physical Key Exchanges" by Gonzalez, E., Balog, R.S., Kish,
L.B., (2015). Entropy, 17(4), pp. 2010-2024; DOI:10.3390/e17042010 Copyright 2015 by MDPI
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A simple method to construct P2P networks is a fully connected network also
known as the complete graph in graph theory. The fully connected network is il-
lustrated in Figure 3.1. The fully connected network does not require a protocol
since every host in the network has a dedicated connection with every other host in
the network, and can process a secure bit exchange with any other host at any time
simultaneously. This network has N   1 key exchangers per host and scales on the
order of N2 for cables and key exchangers, which makes this network impractical
for very large networks. The cost complexities for the fully connected network are
Tcable(N) 2 O(N2), Tke(N) 2 O(N2), and Ttime(N) 2 O(1). We will denote the
fully connected network with N   1 key exchangers per host as FCNN 1. The fully
connected network has N   1 key exchangers for every host resulting in (N   1) N
total key exchangers for the entire network, N   1 direct connections for every host
resulting in (N   1)  N=2 total cables for the entire network. The advantage the
fully connected network has is time, as every host in the network can simultaneously
process a secure bit exchange with every other host in the network.
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Figure 3.1: An illustration of a fully connected network with N   1 communicators
per host (denoted as FCNN 1) has cost complexities of Tcable(N) 2 O(N2), Tke(N) 2
O(N2), and Ttime(N) 2 O(1).
If the cost of having (N   1)  N key exchangers for the entire network is too
costly, then a trade-o between the number of key exchangers and speed might be
preferable. If there is only one key exchanger per host in the fully connected network,
then the cost complexities for the fully connected network will be Tcable(N) 2 O(N2),
Tke(N) 2 O(N), and Ttime(N) 2 O(N), and will require a protocol which we will
denote as FCN1 to process a secure bit exchange with every host in the network.
The fully connected network is robust and reliable as it does not depend on
a single cable or key exchanger. If there is cable destruction or a damaged key
exchanger then only the hosts connected by that cable or key exchanger will be
aected, and only that connection will be aected. The aected hosts will still be
able to process a secure bit exchange with other hosts which do not depend on the
damaged cable or key exchanger.
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To add additional hosts to the fully connected network will be trivial since it
does not have a protocol. In the case of FCN1 the protocol will need to consider the
added host.
3.1.3 Linear Chain Network with Two Key Exchangers per Host
Linear chain networks, also known as bus networks or daisy chain networks, con-
tain a single line and two key exchanges per host as illustrated in Figure 3.2, and
were analyzed in the contexts of smart grids in [32] and in the previous chapter.
The linear chain network with 2 key exchangers per host has cost complexities of
Tcable(N) 2 O(N), Tke(N) 2 O(N), and Ttime(N) 2 O(N2). By having 2 key ex-
changes per host the linear chain network can process 2 simultaneous secure bit
exchanges as long as one host is downstream, for example host i a for any positive
integer a, and the other host is upstream, for example host i+b for any positive
integer b of the ith host. The rst host and the last host are special cases which
cannot have simultaneous secure key exchanges with other hosts [32, 31].
Figure 3.2: An illustration of a linear chain network with 2 key exchangers per host
has cost complexities of Tcable(N) 2 O(N), Tke(N) 2 O(N), and Ttime(N) 2 O(N2).
The reliability of the linear chain network is dependent on the cable. If there is
damage to the cable then the network will become two dierent networks divided
at the location of the damaged cable, and the two networks cannot process a secure
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bit exchange with each other. The linear chain network is more robust if there is
damage to a key exchanger; then only the host with the damaged key exchanger will
be slowed down but it will be able connect with all other hosts on the network since
there are two key exchangers per host.
If an additional host joins the network with N hosts, then the protocol will
consider N + 1 hosts instead of N ; this will be a relatively simple x as the the
protocol can be preprogrammed in the hosts for any N .
3.2 Results and Discussion
3.2.1 Star Network
The star network is a hub and spoke topology with a center switch like an old
telephone exchange switch system and has branches connected to the center. We
denote the star network protocol with one key exchanger per host as STAR. The
cost complexities of the star network are Tcable(N) 2 O(N), Tke(N) 2 O(N), and
Ttime(N) 2 O(N). Figure 3.3 is an example of a star network with N branches.
The most ecient protocol in the star network is similar to the protocol in the
linear chain network in regards to rst connecting to the nearest neighbors, then
connecting the second nearest neighbors, and so on. The star network allows for
faster speed than the linear chain network with similar cable and hardware cost
complexities.
3.2.2 Graph Theory and Previous Work on the Star Network
In graph theory, the hosts are considered vertices and the cables are considered
edges [97]. The protocol of the star network is to connect every host in the network
to process a secure bit exchange with every other host on the network in the least
number of Secure Bit Exchange Period (SBEP) steps. In graph theory, the star net-
work protocol can be described as a special case of an edge-color problem [93] known
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Figure 3.3: An illustration of a star network system with one key exchanger per host
has cost complexities of Tcable(N) 2 O(N), Tke(N) 2 O(N), and Ttime(N) 2 O(N).
as round-robin (RR) tournament or all-play-all tournament problem [65]. The num-
ber, k, of edge colors needed in graph theory is the number of SBEPs needed in the
star network protocol, although many geometric structures and edge-color problems
have been studied in graph theory [95, 96, 3, 9, 76, 37, 34] and applied to various
infrastructure networks [38, 87, 2, 15], they have not been applied to P2P hardware-
based secure key exchange networks other than [32]. Many network applications
assume overlapping signals in the same channel are possible and do not have a ded-
icated channel in which every vertex connects with every other vertex. For QKD
and KLJN network applications, these networks require dedicated communication
channels with no overlapping signals, and RR solutions to dierent geometric struc-
tures. The star network protocol presented in Section 3.2.3 is specically for QKD
and KLJN networks, and is signicant since it combines residual SBEP steps when-
ever possible, thus lowering the total number of SBEPs needed. After a thorough
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literature review a similar RR solution was not found and the most similar solution
found was [3].
3.2.3 Protocol and Analysis of the Star Network
For a network with N hosts, the star key exchange network protocol begins
with every odd numbered host, say ith host with i being odd, and processes a
secure bit exchange with their nearest upstream neighbor, that is host i+1, this will
take one Secure Bit Exchange Period (SBEP) and the secure key exchange between
dierent hosts will occur simultaneously. For example, host 1 will process a secure
bit exchange with host 2, while host 3 will process a secure bit exchange with host
4, while host N   1 will process a secure bit exchange with host N if N is even, or
host N   2 will process a secure bit exchange with host N   1 if N is odd. If N is
odd, then the last host, that is, host N , will not process a secure bit exchange in
the rst SBEP step. The next step in the protocol is for every even numbered host,
say ith host with i being even, to process a secure bit exchange with their nearest
upstream neighbor, say host i+1, simultaneously. For example, host 2 will process
a secure bit exchange with host 3, while host 4 will process a secure bit exchange
with host 5, while host N   1 will process a secure bit exchange with host N if N
is even, or host N will process a secure bit exchange with host 1 if N is odd, note
that the protocol will wrap around from the last host N to the rst host 1. The
circular nature of the star network is a reason why it is faster than the linear chain
network with similar cable and hardware complexities. The star network protocol
STAR then continues with every odd host to process a secure bit exchange with their
upstream second nearest neighbor, that is every ith host with i being odd, with host
i+2, then the even numbered hosts will process a secure bit exchange with their
second nearest neighbor, say every ith host with i being even with host i+2. The
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protocol continues by having every host process a secure bit exchange with their third
nearest neighbors, then fourth nearest neighbors, and continues until every host in
the network has processed a secure bit exchange with every other host.
As an example, Figure 3.4 illustrates every step of the protocol for a STAR
network with 5 hosts. The rst SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated in sub-
gure 3.4a, note how every odd numbered host, i, has a secure bit exchange with their
next upstream nearest neighbor host i+1. The second SBEP step in the protocol
is illustrated in sub-gure 3.4b, note how every even numbered host, i, has a secure
bit exchange with their next upstream nearest neighbor host i+1. The third SBEP
step in the protocol is illustrated in sub-gure 3.4c. Since the number of hosts in the
network is odd, it will take additional SBEP steps to process a secure bit exchange
with these remaining hosts; these are residual SBEP steps. Note how the last host
wraps around to the rst host. The fourth SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated
in sub-gure 3.4d. In this SBEP step, every odd numbered host, i, has a secure bit
exchange with their second upstream nearest neighbor host i+2. The fth SBEP
step in the protocol is illustrated in sub-gure 3.4e, this step is similar to step 4,
except that now the even numbered hosts process a secure bit exchange with their
second upstream nearest neighbors. The sixth and last SBEP step in the protocol is
illustrated in sub-gure 3.4f. Since N is odd, the protocol requires additional residual
SBEP steps to process a secure bit exchange with the remaining hosts. Note that
this example of the STAR protocol with N = 5 hosts requires six SBEP steps for
every host in the network to process a secure bit exchange with every other host.
Table 3.1 demonstrates what every host is doing at every step in the protocol of this
example as illustrated in Figure 3.4. Table 3.2 is the legend for Table 3.1. The arrow
symbol \!" is used as x ! y, meaning host x is processing a secure bit exchange
with host y. The star symbol \F" means the host of this row is being utilized. The
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circle symbol \" means the host of this row is not active.
(a) 1st SBEP step (b) 2nd SBEP step (c) 3rd SBEP step
(d) 4th SBEP step (e) 5th SBEP step (f) 6th SBEP step
Figure 3.4: An illustration of an example of the STAR network protocol for a network
with ve hosts. It takes six Secure Bit Exchange Period (SBEP) steps for every host
in the network to process a secure bit exchange with every other host.
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Host Fig. 3.4a Fig. 3.4b Fig. 3.4c Fig. 3.4d Fig. 3.4e Fig. 3.4f
1 1 ! 2  F 1 ! 3 F 
2 F 2 ! 3  2 ! 4  F
3 3 ! 4 F  F 3 ! 5 
4 F 4 ! 5  F 4 ! 1 
5  F 5 ! 1  F 5 ! 2
Table 3.1: This table demonstrates what every host is doing at every SBEP step in
the STAR protocol as described in the example and illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Symbol Meaning of symbols in Table 3.1
x! y Host x processing a secure bit exchange with host y.
F Host of this row is being utilized.
 Host of this row is inactive.
Table 3.2: This table is the legend of Table 3.1.
The number of SBEPs needed in the STAR protocol is dependent on the number
of hosts, N , in the network. Table 3.3 shows the number of SBEPs needed in the star
network for every host to process a secure bit exchange with every other host in the
network, for star networks with up to 20 hosts. Figure 3.5 is the plot of Table 3.3,
with N being the independent variable and SBEP being the dependent variable. The
linear regression line is f(N) = 1:3192982456 N   1:301754386, and the coecient
of determination is R2 = 0:988989157.
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N , number of hosts in star network SBEP(N), number of SBEP steps
needed for a network with N
hosts
2 1
3 3
4 3
5 6
6 6
7 8
8 8
9 12
10 12
11 14
12 14
13 17
14 17
15 19
16 19
17 22
18 22
19 24
20 24
Table 3.3: This table shows the number of SBEPs needed in star networks with 2
hosts to 20 hosts, for every host in the network to execute a secure bit exchange with
every other host.
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Figure 3.5: This is the plot of Table 3.3. The data points are plotted along with
a linear regression line which is f(N) = 1:3192982456  N   1:301754386, and the
coecient of determination is R2 = 0:988989157. The horizontal axis (independent
variable) is N , meaning the number of hosts in the star network. The vertical axis
(dependent variable) is SBEP(N), meaning the number of SBEP steps needed for a
network with N hosts.
The patterns and relations in the star network protocol can be seen in Table 3.3
and Figure 3.5. Note that when N is evenly divisible by 2 it will take exactly 2
SBEP steps for every host, i, to process a secure bit exchange with their nearest
neighbor host i+1. If N is not evenly divisible by 2 then it will take exactly 3 SBEP
steps for every host i to process a secure bit exchange with their nearest neighbor
host i+1. The results are the same for every case when N is divided by 3, 4, 5, ...,
(N   1)=2, and every host i processes a secure bit exchange with their second, third,
fourth, ..., (N   2)=2th nearest neighbor, that is host i+2, i+3, i+4, ..., i+(N   2)
respectively. There is a unique case when N is even and is divided by N=2, in this
case only one SBEP step is needed to process a secure bit exchange. The residual
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steps are combined whenever possible. For example, in the case when N = 7, the
6th and 9th steps can be combined into one step, resulting in one less SBEP step.
These patterns and relations were used to conceive equations (3.1a) through (3.1d),
where the \de" symbol in the equations is the ceiling function, N is the number of
hosts, and SBEP(N) is the number of SBEPs needed to share an independent secure
bit for each possible pair formed in the network, which means each host share N   1
secure bits. (Note, after this sharing each possible pair formed in the network has
only a single bit of their respective secure key. Thus to share a key with k bits, the
above process must be repeated k times.)
SBEP(N) = N +

N
4

  2 for N  8 and N is even: (3.1a)
SBEP(N) = N +

N
4

  1 for N  8 and N is odd: (3.1b)
SBEP(N) = N +

N
4

  1 for N > 8 and N is even: (3.1c)
SBEP(N) = N +

N
4

for N > 8 and N is odd: (3.1d)
The reliability of the star network is dependent on its center switch, cables, and
key exchangers. One could sabotage the entire network just by damaging the center
switch in the star network. If a cable or key exchanger is damaged in the star network,
then the aected host will be eectively disconnected from the entire network, but
the unaected hosts will be able to continue processing a secure bit exchange with
other hosts in the network.
To add additional hosts in the star network will require every host in the network
to change the protocol from N to N + 1, which is a relatively simple process since
the protocols can be preprogrammed in the hosts.
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The star network could be utilized in many situations including vehicle infor-
mation networks [88, 13] and inside equipment with components spread around a
central processing unit such as a computer.
3.2.4 Comparing Network Topologies
Table 3.4 compares cost complexities of the fully connected network with N   1
key exchangers per host denoted by FCNN 1, the fully connected network with 1
key exchanger per host denoted by FCN1, the linear chain network protocol with
2 key exchangers per host is denoted by LCH, and the star network protocol with
1 communicator per host denoted by STAR. As can be seen from Table 3.4, the
fastest network is the FCNN 1 network, the networks with the least cost (lowest cost
complexities) of cables are the linear chain network and the star network, and the
networks with the least cost (lowest cost complexities) of key exchangers are FCN1,
linear chain network, and star network. These results will hold for both KLJN and
QKD systems. These results show that the star network has better performance than
the linear chain network with similar cost complexities for cables and key exchangers.
Network topology Tcable(N) Tke(N) Ttime(N)
FCNN 1 O(N2) O(N2) O(1)
FCN1 O(N
2) O(N) O(N)
LCH O(N) O(N) O(N2)
STAR O(N) O(N) O(N)
Table 3.4: This table summarizes the cost complexities of the fully connected net-
works FCNN 1, FCN1, the linear chain network protocol LCH, and the star network
protocol STAR.
The robustness and reliability of each network is dependent on its geometric
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topology. If a cable is damaged, then it is best to have a FCNN 1 network since
only one connection between two hosts will be lost. In the linear chain network
the entire network will be divided. In the star network, the aected host will be
completely disconnected from the network. If a key exchanger is damaged, then it
is best to have a linear chain network since the only consequences will be a slower
secure bit exchange process, but every host will still be able to process a secure bit
exchange with every other host. In the FCNN 1 network, a damaged key exchanger
will only aect one connection between two hosts. In the star network, a damaged
key exchanger will completely disconnect the aected host from the entire network.
Another vulnerability of the star network is the center switch; if the center switch
is damaged then the entire network is disconnected. Based on these three networks,
one can argue that the most robust, reliable network is the FCNN 1 followed by the
linear chain network, and the least robust network of these three would be the star
network.
To add hosts to the FCNN 1 network would be trivial since the FCNN 1 does
not need a protocol; all that is needed is to connect the host to every other host. To
add hosts to the linear chain network and the star network will require every host
in the network to change the protocol from N hosts to N + 1 hosts; this will be a
relatively simple process as every host can be preprogrammed.
3.2.5 Open Questions and Future Studies
The star network has cost complexity of O(N) for the number of cables, key
exchangers, and time, but there are still numerous other geometric network topologies
that have not been explored that might benet KLJN and QKD systems. Other
examples for possible networks include matrix networks, that is, a grid of several
vertical lines and horizontal lines. The matrix network might be a good model for an
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urban city with squared blocks. A wheel network is another possibility that might
outperform the star network. A wheel network is similar to a star network but
with a connecting loop around the branches. A web network is another interesting
network similar to the wheel network but with concentric circles connecting the inner
branches. A web network is similar to a spider web with each node being a host. A
cube network is another interesting possibility that could be utilized in a skyscraper.
A cube network is similar to the matrix network except that it has three dimensions.
A sphere network might be another interesting three-dimensional network that can
be compared with the cube network.
Since dierent geometrical topologies give dierent trade-os, another interest is
to explore the trade-os of the dierent networks, and why it is preferable to sacrice
speed, communicators, or key exchangers for infrastructure and vice versa. Another
possible interest is to analyze and compare every geometric network with dierent
number of communicators and how well they scale with speed. Another possibility is
to combine several of these networks into one network and analyze its performance;
in graph theory this is known as hybrid networks.
Dierent geometric network structures have dierent vulnerabilities; an analysis
of each network's vulnerabilities, robustness, reliability, and dierent kinds of attacks
would be interesting to explore and compare.
In the next chapter we will explore wireless networks and propose a key exchange
trust evaluation since KLJN is not possible on wireless networks.
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4. EVALUATING KEY EXCHANGE TRUST IN SENSOR NETWORKS WITH
CONSIDERATION OF UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE KEY
EXCHANGE3
4.1 Sensor Networks, Security Concerns, Trust Mechanisms, and Unconditionally
Secure Key Exchanges.
4.1.1 Sensor Networks
Sensor networks consist of sensors that measure and provide information in re-
mote or spatially distributed areas [20]. With the advancement of miniaturization
and wireless technologies, the ubiquity of sensor networks is becoming more prevalent.
The benets of having smaller dies in semiconductors include: physically smaller de-
vices, increased ratio of computing power per energy, better battery life, etc. A
few examples that utilize sensor networks include military, health care, environment
monitoring, agriculture, etc.
Sensors are often required to be autonomous, decentralized, and in remote ar-
eas. Such requirements place limitations on sensors and sensor networks, including
low power, limited memory and data storage, physical size, limited communication
bandwidth, cost, privacy, and security [84, 80, 4]. There are proposed solutions for
some of these limitations such as energy harvesting, low-power processors, smaller
memory footprint, etc. However, security is a pressing issue since sensors face unique
challenges. Without proper security the entire sensor network can be compromised
3 Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Key Exchange Trust Evaluation in Peer-
to-Peer Sensor Networks With Unconditionally Secure Key Exchange" by Gonzalez, E., Kish, L.B.,
(2016). A print and electronic version of this article published in Fluctuation and Noise Letters,
Vol. 15, No. 1, 2016, pp. 165008 (17 pages) DOI:10.1142/S0219477516500085 cWorld Scientic
Publishing Company http://www.worldscientic.com/worldscinet/fnl
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and sabotaged.
4.1.2 Security Concerns
Limited computing power in sensors restrict them from utilizing large, complex
encryption algorithms; also with limited memory and data storage, the secure key
cannot be too large. Another security issue facing sensors is that the installation
of optical ber or wire connections is often not economical. Thus they are often
accessible only by wireless communication, which is restricted to work with con-
ditionally secure key exchange, which makes them vulnerable to packet capture,
sning, and injection [83, 92, 21, 22, 62, 64, 35, 39]. In an attempt to mitigate
some of these security issues, there have been several proposals to secure sensor net-
works, which include defenses against specic attacks and more ecient protocols
[83, 92, 21, 22, 62, 64, 35, 39].
Sensor networks require data condentiality, data integrity, data freshness, avail-
ability, self-organization, time synchronization, authentication, secure broadcasting
and multicasting, and sensor privacy. Attacks on sensor networks include Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, Sybil attacks, trac analysis attacks, information
ooding attacks, and node replication attacks [83, 92, 21, 22, 62, 64, 35, 39]. Defen-
sive measures against some of these attacks are key establishment, key encryption,
policy-based approaches, intrusion detection, and trust management. There have
been several approaches for managing trust in sensor networks; the approach to
trust management is based on the sensor network's trust mechanism.
4.1.3 Trust Mechanisms
Trust theory has dierent applications and perspectives, and the concept of trust
has been associated with past behaviors and/or reputation from trusted peers [10,
33, 43, 7, 19, 85]. The notion of trust has been specied by trust denitions, trust
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characteristics, and trust values [99]. Trust values have been measured by several
dierent methodologies such as: Bayesian models [61], Beta distribution systems
[41], subjective logic models [42], entropy models [14], fuzzy models [12], and game
theory models [46]. However, these trust value models are not able to distinguish
between conditional and unconditionally secure key exchanges, and thus need to be
expanded for related applications.
Rather than expanding former models, we propose a new key exchange trust
evaluation model, which takes into account the type of key exchange (conditional or
unconditional) between two sensors.
Utilizing KLJN in sensor networks could signicantly increase the security level
in sensor networks due to its unconditionally secure key exchange.
4.1.4 Motivation for a Key Exchange Trust Evaluation
Current trust measures for sensor networks do not utilize unconditionally secure
key exchange. Trust is a belief that may change over time, and is usually based on
past behaviors and/or reputation from a community. Many sensor networks measure
trust based on past behaviors and/or reputation [10, 33, 43, 7, 19, 85], but there has
not been a trust measurement that considers the class (conditionally/unconditionally
secure) of the key exchange utilized in their measurement of trust. We propose a
new key exchange trust system that considers the class of the key exchange. The
system utilizes the Geometric series to evaluate the key exchange trust, thus we call
it the G key exchange trust function.
4.2 Outline of Combined Wired and Wireless Sensor Networks
In this chapter we consider P2P networks only. In such a network it will be
impractical to have direct wired connections from every sensor to every other sensor,
thus we propose to use both wired and wireless communication channels, and form
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a wired-wireless hybrid network. The wired sensors can be utilized in areas where
other sensors are in close proximity. Each sensor can then be ranked based on its key
exchange and the number of key exchanges with trusted peers. We therefore propose
the G key exchange trust measure system.
4.2.1 Network
The wired-wireless network will require sensors to have at least two communica-
tion devices, one for wireless and one or more for wired. A cable will also be required
and can have either one or two wires inside. One wire will be for the key exchange,
and the other optional wire can be utilized as a data communication channel.
Figure 4.1 is an illustration and example of the proposed wired-wireless hybrid
sensor network with ten sensors. In this example, sensors A through G utilize both
wired and wireless communication channels, and sensors H through J utilize only its
wireless communication channel. Sensors A and B have a direct connection with the
base station, and thus they can have an unconditionally secure key exchange with
the operator. Note how sensor E has two wired connections; this sensor will require
two KLJN communicators. Sensors C, F, and G have only one wired connection
and will require one KLJN communicator. Sensors A, B, and D have three wired
connections, and will require three KLJN communicators. Sensors H through J only
use their wireless communication channel; these sensors are the most vulnerable to
attacks and thus have a low key exchange trust value. Table 4.1 lists every sensor's
key exchange with all sensors in the network of Figure 4.1, e.g., sensor A has a
KLJN key exchange with sensors B and D, thus we denote this in set notation as
Akljn = fB;Dg. Similarly, sensor A has a wireless key exchange with sensors C,
E, F, G, H, I, and J; we denote this as Awireless = fC;E;F;G;H; I; Jg. Note that
Akljn \ Awireless = ;, that is, every sensor communicating with sensor A must be
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classied as having either a wired KLJN key exchange or a wireless key exchange,
but not both. The G key exchange trust system is discussed and analyzed in the
following section.
Figure 4.1: An illustration of a wired-wireless hybrid sensor network. In this example
there are ten sensors with only select sensors utilizing wired communication channels
and all sensors utilizing wireless communication channels.
4.2.2 Protocol
Before sensors can process a KLJN key exchange, the KLJN communicators must
be authenticated. The authentication of two KLJN units must be completed before
they are separated. The KLJN communicator units have a direct wired connection
with each other and thus there is no need for networking protocols, only the KLJN
key exchange protocol. However, due to the required pre-authentication of the KLJN
communicator units, the sensor network's topography must be planned ahead.
Since the wired KLJN key exchange has been pre-planned, only the wireless key
exchanges need to be processed. Once all sensors in the network have a key exchange
with every other sensor in the network, every sensor in the network will classify its
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Sensor Wired KLJN Key Exchange Wireless Key Exchange
A Akljn = fB;Dg Awireless = fC;E;F;G;H; I; Jg
B Bkljn = fA;Eg Bwireless = fC;D;F;G;H; I; Jg
C Ckljn = fDg Cwireless = fA;B;E;F;G;H; I; Jg
D Dkljn = fA;C;Eg Dwireless = fB;F;G;H; I; Jg
E Ekljn = fB;Dg Ewireless = fA;C;F;G;H; I; Jg
F Fkljn = fGg Fwireless = fA;B;C;D;E;H; I; Jg
G Gkljn = fFg Gwireless = fA;B;C;D;E;H; I; Jg
H Hkljn = ; Hwireless = fA;B;C;D;E;F;G; I; Jg
I Ikljn = ; Iwireless = fA;B;C;D;E;F;G;H; Jg
J Jkljn = ; Jwireless = fA;B;C;D;E;F;G;H; Ig
Table 4.1: This table lists every sensor's key exchange with all sensors in the network
of Figure 4.1. Every sensor is classied as having either a wired KLJN key exchange
or a wireless key exchange. Set notation is used to categorize the sets as either KLJN
or wireless key exchange.
key exchange with every peer as being either wired or wireless, e.g., Akljn and Awireless,
Bkljn and Bwireless, etc.
4.3 Geometric Key Exchange Trust System
4.3.1 The Key Exchange Trust Function
The geometric key exchange trust system was designed to have a trust function,
Gij, with a range of values, Gij 2 [0; 1], as a measure of the key exchange trust of
sensor i for its communication channel with sensor j. The function Gij is for sensor
i to evaluate the key exchange trust value of sensor j. The input parameters of the
function Gij are ikljn, iwireless, jkljn, and jwireless; these parameters are provided by the
operator or the base station.
4.3.2 The Kill Switch
The kill switch, j, is a binary parameter of sensor j in the Gij function, which is
set by the operator to j = 0 when the security of sensor j is compromised, and to
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j = 1 otherwise. The construction of the Gij function (see below) guarantees that
for j = 0 then Gij = 0.
4.3.3 Construction of the Key Exchange Trust Function
When constructing the Gij function, the following goals should be satised:
(i) The contributing terms to the Gij function are determined by:
(a) The number, Kij, of mutual KLJN key exchanges with sensors i and j, or
Kij = jikljn \ jkljnj;
(b) The number, Wj, of KLJN key exchanges with sensor j reduced by Kij,
or
Wj = jjkljn n (ikljn \ jkljn)j;
(c) The number, Zj, of only wireless key exchanges in sensor j or Zj =
jjwirelessj.
(ii) Strictly monotonic function. The function Gij is a strictly monotonically in-
creasing function determined by the values Kij, Wj, and Zj. For example, if
sensors j and k have values Kij = Kik,Wj = Wk, and Zj > Zk, then Gij > Gik.
As a consequence among the non-compromised sensors, the sensor with a single
wireless key exchange should have the lowest contribution.
(iii) Ranks versus class of connections. The contribution of the term containing Zj
will never exceed the contribution of the term containing Wj; the joint contri-
bution of the terms containing Wj and Zj will never exceed the contribution
of the term containing Kij. The reason for this requirement is so that KLJN
is the only unconditionally secure key exchange type in the network and thus
the rank of its trust is higher.
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In terms of j; Kij;Wj; Zj dened in 4.3.3(i) above, equation (4.1) below is the
key exchange trust value of sensor i to sensor j:
Gij =
8>><>>:
j if j 2 ikljn
j G(Kij;Wj; Zj) if j =2 ikljn
(4.1)
with
G(K;W;Z) =
KX
n=1
an +
WX
n=1
bn +
ZX
n=1
cn (4.2)
where G : f1; 2; :::g3 ! [0; 1] is a strictly increasing function with respect to the
lexicographic order (4.3.3(ii)) and also satises the requirement of 4.3.3(iii) above. It
should be noted that the postulates of Gij allow for several versions of G
, not only
the one given in equation (4.1). The question arises, why choose geometric series
in contributing terms? We chose the geometric series because of the properties
q = minG, supG = 1. The postulates are;
a =
1X
n=1
(bn + cn);
b =
1X
n=1
cn;
1 =
1X
n=1
(an + bn + cn);
1 > a > b > c > 0:
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The ratios a, b, and c can be deduced as follows:
1X
n=1
an +
1X
n=1
(bn + cn) =
a
1  a + a = 1
) a2   3a+ 1 = 0
) a = (3 
p
5)=2  0:3820;
1X
n=0
bn +
1X
n=0
cn =
b
1  b + b = a
) b2   (a+ 2)b+ a = 0
) b  0:1729;
1X
n=1
cn =
c
1  c = b
) c  0:1474;
with a  0:3820, b  0:1729, and c  0:1474. The ratios can placed into equa-
tion (4.2) to obtain a equation (4.3) below:
G(K;W;Z) =
KX
n=1
(0:3820)n +
WX
n=1
(0:1729)n +
ZX
n=1
(0:1474)n: (4.3)
Equation (4.1) can then be written as equation (4.4),
Gij =
8>><>>:
j if j 2 ikljn
j 
 PK
n=1(0:3820)
n +
PW
n=1(0:1729)
n +
PZ
n=1(0:1474)
n

if j =2 ikljn
(4.4)
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with K = jikljn \ jkljnj, W = jjkljn n (ikljn \ jkljn)j, Z = jjwirelessj, and j = f0; 1g. The
case j = 0 sets Gij = 0. To satisfy the conditions Gij  1 and (i) through (iii)
above, we used the following requirements:
(i) The third (Zn=1) geometric series will saturate at the geometric coecient of
the second (Wn=1) series. That is, the third series, in the case of Zj !1 yields
0:1729.
(ii) The sum of the second (Wn=1) and third (
Z
n=1) series, will saturate at the
geometric coecient of the rst (Kn=1) series. That is, in the case of Zj !1
and Wj !1, their ratio sum yields 0:3820.
(iii) The sum of the three geometric series will saturate to one. That is, in the case
of Zj !1, Wj !1, and Kj !1, their ratio sum yields to one.
The details of the derivation are shown in the next section.
4.3.4 Derivation of G
The G key exchange trust system has a range from zero to one and a kill switch.
It must also consider an innite number of sensors, and that a sensor in a lower
level cannot undermine a sensor in a higher level. To achieve this, we propose to
utilize the geometric series since the geometric series can add an innite sum (or the
number of sensors) and equal to a nite value (or one.) Since the highest possible
value is one, and with an innite number of sensors, then the G key exchange trust
system of sensor j relative to sensor i can be written as
Gij(j) = j 
1X
n=1
an + bn + cn = j  1; (4.5)
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with j 2 f0; 1g being the kill switch of sensor j, and a, b, and c being the ratios.
To solve for ratios a, b, and c, in equation (4.5) we note that
1X
n=1
an + bn + cn = 1: (4.6)
Note that the following properties must apply according to the G key exchange trust
system. The rst property is
1X
n=1
cn = b; (4.7)
which means that an innite number of sensors in the third series (
P1
n=1 c
n) cannot
undermine a single sensor in the second series (b =
P1
n=1 b
n) or b > c > 0 for any
;  2 N. The second property is
1X
n=1
bn + cn = a; (4.8)
which means that an innite number of sensors in the second series (
P1
n=1 b
n) and
an innite number of sensors in the third series (
P1
n=1 c
n) cannot undermine a single
sensor in the rst series (a =
P1
n=1 a
n) or 1 > a > b + c > 0 for any ; ;  2 N.
Equation (4.7) and equation (4.8) can be rewritten to isolate the innite summation
of b as follows:
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1X
n=1
bn = a  b:
Also, note that if r 2 R : jrj < 1 then P1n=1 rn = r1 r . Given these properties
equation (4.6) can be derived as:
1X
n=1
an + bn + cn = 1;
1X
n=1
an +
1X
n=1
bn +
1X
n=1
cn = 1;
1X
n=1
an +
 
a  b+  b = 1;
1X
n=1
an + a = 1;
a
1  a + a = 1:
The resulting equation, a=(1 a)+ a = 1, can be solved for a by using the quadratic
formula giving values a = (3  p5)=2 and a = (3 +p5)=2. Since jaj < 1, then the
only converging value is a = (3 p5)=2. Thus the ratio a is
a =
3 p5
2
 0:3820: (4.9)
A similar method can be used to solve for b and c in equation (4.6).
To solve for b note that
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1X
n=1
bn = a  b;
b
1  b = a  b: (4.10)
Solving for b in equation (4.10) gives two solutions. The converging solution is,
b =
a+ 2 +
p
a2 + 4
2
: (4.11)
Given equation (4.9) and substituting for a in equation (4.11) gives
b =
7 p5 
p
30  6p5
4
 0:1729: (4.12)
Thus the ratio b is given by equation (4.12).
The ratio c can be solved by utilizing equation (4.7). Note that
1X
n=1
cn = b;
c
1  c = b: (4.13)
Given equation (4.12) and substituting for b in equation (4.13), then solving for c
will give
c =
p
30  6p5 +p5  7p
30  6p5 +p5  11
 0:1474: (4.14)
Thus the ratio c is given by equation (4.14).
The derivations above were derived to consider any number of sensors, thus the
G key exchange trust function holds for zero sensors to an innite number of sensors.
In reality there will be a limited number of sensors in a network.
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The ratio a will only consider sensors that are conditionally secured with mutual
KLJN key exchanges, e.g., if sensor i and sensor j have mutual KLJN key exchanges
with third parties, then this can be written in set notation as the intersection of
sensor i's ikljn set and sensor j's jkljn set. This can be expressed as ikljn \ jkljn. The
number of mutual KLJN key exchanges with third parties between sensors i and j
can be expressed as K = jikljn \ jkljnj. Thus, there are K mutual sensors between
sensors i and j.
The ratio b will only consider sensors that are conditionally secured without
mutual KLJN key exchanges, e.g., if sensor i evaluates the number of key exchanges
in sensor j, then only the number of KLJN key exchanges in sensor j that do not
have mutual KLJN key exchanges with sensor i will be noted. This can be expressed
as W = jjkljn n (ikljn\ jkljn)j. The purpose of having ratio b is based on the belief that
a sensor with a KLJN key exchange should have a higher key exchange trust value
than a sensor without a KLJN key exchange.
The ratio c will only consider sensors that are conditionally secured with only
wireless key exchanges, e.g., if sensor j only has wireless key exchanges with other
sensors then the number of sensors that can verify a wireless key exchange with
sensor j is Z = jjwirelessj.
The G key exchange trust system can evaluate the key exchange trust level of
sensor j relative to sensor i, which can be expressed as Gij(j), with j being the kill
switch for sensor j. Gij(j) can be expressed as the following equation;
Gij(j) =
8>><>>:
j if j 2 ikljn
j 
 PK
n=1(0:3820)
n +
PW
n=1(0:1729)
n +
PZ
n=1(0:1474)
n

if j =2 ikljn;
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with K = jikljn \ jkljnj, W = jjkljn n (ikljn \ jkljn)j, Z = jjwirelessj, and j = f0; 1g.
4.3.5 Example
Equation (4.4) was applied to the network in Figure 4.1. The G key exchange
trust values for all the sensors in Figure 4.1 are in Table 4.2. From Table 4.2 some
properties of G can be observed. The G function is asymmetric, e.g., in Table 4.2
note that GBC 6= GCB. There is also incomplete transitive, e.g., in Table 4.2 note
that GAD = 1 and GDC = 1, but GAC = 0:555 and does not equal one. Note that the
G function given by equation (4.4) is unique for the given conditions. The conditions
are to have a range between zero and one and a kill switch. Also note that an innite
number of sensors in lower levels will not undermine a single sensor in a higher level.
j
Sensor A B C D E F G H I J
i
A 1 1 0.555 1 0.701 0.346 0.346 0.173 0.173 0.173
B 1 1 0.346 0.874 1 0.346 0.346 0.173 0.173 0.173
C 0.728 0.376 1 1 0.728 0.346 0.346 0.173 0.173 0.173
D 1 0.701 1 1 1 0.346 0.346 0.173 0.173 0.173
E 0.701 1 0.555 1 1 0.346 0.346 0.173 0.173 0.173
F 0.376 0.376 0.346 0.381 0.376 1 1 0.173 0.173 0.173
G 0.376 0.376 0.346 0.381 0.376 1 1 0.173 0.173 0.173
H 0.376 0.376 0.346 0.381 0.376 0.346 0.346 1 0.173 0.173
I 0.376 0.376 0.346 0.381 0.376 0.346 0.346 0.173 1 0.173
J 0.376 0.376 0.346 0.381 0.376 0.346 0.3458 0.173 0.173 1
Table 4.2: This table lists Gij key exchange trust values for all the sensors in Fig-
ure 4.1. This table assumes j = 1 for all js.
As shown in Table 4.2, the G key exchange trust system will give a higher key
exchange trust evaluation to sensors that are part of a KLJN key exchange, the more
KLJN key exchanges a sensor has, the higher the key exchange trust evaluation. Sen-
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sors without a KLJN key exchange will have a lower key exchange trust evaluation,
even if there are an innite number of sensors with only wireless key exchange. This
mechanism will prevent a lower level sensor attempting to undermine a higher level
sensor since there are ceiling limits to sensors that only share a wireless key exchange.
A kill switch is in place to allow the G system to remain subjective with any sensor
at any time.
4.4 Open Questions and Future Work
Since all sensors in the G system must have both wired and wireless commu-
nication channels it will not be practical in some applications. Sensors in the G
system will also need to utilize both symmetric encryption for the KLJN key ex-
change and asymmetric encryption for the wireless key exchange; this will increase
energy requirements, computing requirements, memory, and data storage. Sensors
are dependent on the operator or base station to provide or broadcast the KLJN
and wireless key exchange sets of every sensor in the network; this dependency will
require the sensors to remain centralized. For sensors to be autonomous, future work
must be done where each sensor can broadcast its key exchange sets. Another con-
cern is concealing the cable between the wired sensors. Unconditionally secure key
exchange has not been experimented with in sensor networks, but the realization of
such a network should be of signicant interest. The cost of having uncondition-
ally secure key exchange for sensor networks is high, but such is the price for high
security.
For sensors that cannot communicate with other sensors or the base station due
to the distance between them, a multi-hop method is utilized [81]. The G system
does not consider multi-hop cases and would give the sensor a key exchange trust
evaluation of the last sensor it was able to communicate with; this can be improved in
70
future work. Sensor networks can also utilize dierent protocols for dierent KLJN
geometric networks to reduce the cable, time, and KLJN communicators cost as has
been analyzed in [32, 31, 28, 29, 30].
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5. CONCLUSION1;2;3
In this work we have introduced a protocol for linear chain networks to oer
unconditionally secure key exchange over the smart grid. We used a recongurable
lter system and proposed a special protocol for linear chain networks to create
non-overlapping single loops in the smart power grid for the realization of Kirchho-
Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise secure key distribution system. We carried out a scaling
analysis for the speed of the protocol versus the size of the grid. When properly
generalized, such a system has the potential to achieve unconditionally secure key
distribution over the smart power grid of arbitrary dimensions.
Before the implementation of the protocol on linear chain networks can take place,
several practical questions must be answered, such as the impact of nite and possibly
varying wire resistance, capacitance, power load on the security, and the applications
of relevant privacy amplication methods. Other questions include changing size N ,
hacking penetration attacks against the lter control, and the relevant defensive
tools. We also discussed the limitations of the KLJN key exchange protocol, open
questions surrounding the implementation on smart grids, and future work required.
Since this work is a system-concept study we leave the details to future work.
1 Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Information Theoretically Secure, En-
hanced Johnson Noise Based Key Distribution over the Smart Grid with Switched Filters" by
Gonzalez, E., Kish, L.B., Balog, R.S., Prasad, E., (2013). PLoS ONE, 8(7): e70206 Copyright 2013
by PLOS
2 Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Resource Requirements and Speed versus
Geometry of Unconditionally Secure Physical Key Exchanges" by Gonzalez, E., Balog, R.S., Kish,
L.B., (2015). Entropy, 17(4), pp. 2010-2024; DOI:10.3390/e17042010 Copyright 2015 by MDPI
3 Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Key Exchange Trust Evaluation in Peer-
to-Peer Sensor Networks With Unconditionally Secure Key Exchange" by Gonzalez, E., Kish, L.B.,
(2016). A print and electronic version of this article published in Fluctuation and Noise Letters,
Vol. 15, No. 1, 2016, pp. 165008 (17 pages) DOI:10.1142/S0219477516500085 cWorld Scientic
Publishing Company http://www.worldscientic.com/worldscinet/fnl
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We also considered the need for unconditional secure key exchange along with
the need to have P2P networks since QKD and KLJN require P2P networks. We
reviewed a simple P2P network known as the fully connected network. We also
reviewed the linear chain network and analyzed the star network to compared it
with fully connected networks and linear chain networks. We conceived a protocol
and equations (3.1a) through (3.1d) to describe star networks. The results show
that the star network compares favorably to the linear chain network and the fully
connected network. Even though the star network utilizes only one key exchanger
per host, its time complexity is superior to that of the linear chain network, while its
cable complexity is the same. The star network's cable and key exchanger complexity
is superior to that of the fully connected network, while its time complexity is worse
than FCNN 1, but is similar to FCN1. We found that the star network fairs worse
than the linear chain network and the fully connected network in robustness and
reliability as the star network can be entirely disconnected by damaging the center
switch. We then considered several other possible network geometries that might be
interesting to explore and to compare.
We also introduced sensor networks along with some applications, limitations, and
security issues. We then discuss unconditionally secure key exchanges, and mention
how the KLJN key exchange can be included in sensor networks. We also mention
current trust methodologies for sensor networks. Since current trust methodologies
do not consider unconditionally secure key exchange we introduce the geometric key
exchange trust system, a new key exchange trust method for sensor networks that
considers unconditionally secure key exchange in the key exchange trust measure.
An example of sensor networks with sensors utilizing both wired and wireless com-
munication channels is depicted in Figure 4.1. The G key exchange trust system is
then introduced and applied to the sensor network example in Figure 4.1. The G key
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exchange trust system is then analyzed, discussed, and modeled by equation (4.4).
Table 4.2 shows that a higher key exchange trust evaluation is given to sensors with
KLJN key exchanges, and the more KLJN key exchanges a sensor has, the higher
the key exchange trust evaluation. Equation (4.4) and Table 4.2 also show that there
are ceiling limits to sensors that only share a wireless key exchange. The G system
depends on the operator or base station to provide the key exchange sets of every
sensor in the network. The kill switch allows the G system to remain subjective of
every sensor in the network. We then discuss open questions about the G system
and possible future improvements.
We believe this work in applying unconditionally secure key exchange over smart
grid networks will generate interest as we transcend the dark ages of information
security.
74
REFERENCES
[1] NSA Director: China can damage U.S. power grid. https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=Pw79NyHleB8, November 2014. Accessed: 2014-11-20.
[2] Udo Adamy, Thomas Erlebach, Dieter Mitsche, Ingo Schurr, Bettina Speck-
mann, and Emo Welzl. Approximation and Online Algorithms: Second In-
ternational Workshop, WAOA 2004, Bergen, Norway, September 14-16, 2004,
Revised Selected Papers, chapter O-line Admission Control for Advance Reser-
vations in Star Networks, pages 211{224. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2005.
[3] Jin Akiyama and Mikio Kano. Path factors of a graph, Graph Theory and its
Applications. Wiley, New York, 1984.
[4] Moshaddique A. Ameen, Jingwei Liu, and Kyungsup Kwak. Security and
privacy issues in wireless sensor networks for healthcare applications. Journal
of medical systems, 36(1):93{101, 2012.
[5] Saurabh M. Amin and Bruce F. Wollenberg. Toward a smart grid: Power
delivery for the 21st century. IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, 3(5):34{41,
Sept 2005.
[6] Robert S. Balog and Philip T. Krein. Coupled-inductor lter: A basic lter
building block. Power Electronics, IEEE Transactions on, 28(1):537{546, 2013.
[7] Fenye Bao, Ing R. Chen, Moon J. Chang, and Jin H. Cho. Hierarchical trust
management for wireless sensor networks and its applications to trust-based
routing and intrusion detection. IEEE Transactions on Network and Service
Management, 9(2):169{183, June 2012.
75
[8] Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public key
distribution and coin tossing. In International Conference on Computer System
and Signal Processing, IEEE, 1984, pages 175{179, December 1984. Bangalore,
India.
[9] L'udmila Bezegova, Borut Luzar, Martina Mockovciakova, Roman Sotak, and
Riste Skrekovski. Star edge coloring of some classes of graphs. Journal of
Graph Theory, 81(1):73{82, 2016.
[10] Matt Blaze, Joan Feigenbaum, and John Lacy. Decentralized trust manage-
ment. In Security and Privacy, 1996. Proceedings., 1996 IEEE Symposium on,
pages 164{173, May 1996.
[11] Jeremy J. Blum, Azim Eskandarian, and Lance J. Homan. Challenges of
intervehicle ad hoc networks. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation
Systems, 5(4):347{351, Dec 2004.
[12] Azzedine Boukerche and Yonglin Ren. A trust-based security system for ubiq-
uitous and pervasive computing environments. Computer Communications,
31(18):4343{4351, 2008.
[13] Xiaolin Cao, Yessica Saez, Geza Pesti, and Laszlo B. Kish. On KLJN-based
secure key distribution in vehicular communication networks. Fluctuation and
Noise Letters, 14(01):1550008, 2015.
[14] Ariel Caticha and Adom Gin. Updating probabilities. arXiv preprint
physics/0608185, 2006.
[15] Shu-Park Chan. Network topology and its engineering applications. National
Taiwan University Press, 1975.
76
[16] Hsien-Pu Chen, Laszlo B. Kish, and Claes G. Granqvist. On the \cracking"
scheme in the paper \A directional coupler attack against the Kish key dis-
tribution system" by Gunn, Allison and Abbott. Metrology and Measurement
Systems, 21(3):389{400, 2014.
[17] Hsien-Pu Chen, Elias Gonzalez, Yessica Saez, and Laszlo B. Kish. Cable capaci-
tance attack against the KLJN secure key exchange. Information, 6(4):719{732,
2015.
[18] Hsien-Pu Chen, Laszlo B. Kish, Claes G. Granqvist, and Gabor Schmera. Do
electromagnetic waves exist in a short cable at low frequencies? what does
physics say? Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 13(02):1450016, 2014.
[19] Youngho Cho, Gang Qu, and Yuanming Wu. Insider threats against trust
mechanism with watchdog and defending approaches in wireless sensor net-
works. In Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), 2012 IEEE Symposium on,
pages 134{141, May 2012.
[20] David Culler, Deborah Estrin, and Mani Srivastava. Guest editors' introduc-
tion: Overview of sensor networks. Computer, 37(8):41{49, Aug 2004.
[21] Raju Dutta, Shishir Gupta, and Debraj Paul. Energy ecient modied spin
protocol with high security in wireless sensor networks using tossim. In Parallel,
Distributed and Grid Computing (PDGC), 2014 International Conference on,
pages 290{294, Dec 2014.
[22] Mona El and Eman Shaaban. Enhancing s-leach security for wireless sensor
networks. In Electro/Information Technology (EIT), 2012 IEEE International
Conference on, pages 1{6, May 2012.
77
[23] Eric Engleman and Jordan Robertson. Obama to share cybersecurity pri-
orities with congress. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-27/
obama-to-share-cybersecurity-priorities-with-congress.html,
February 2013. Accessed: 2013-06-26.
[24] Niels Ferguson and Bruce Schneier. Practical cryptography, volume 23. Wiley
New York, 2003.
[25] Ilja Gerhardt, Qin Liu, Anta Lamas-Linares, Johannes Skaar, Christian Kurt-
siefer, and Vadim Makarov. Full-eld implementation of a perfect eavesdropper
on a quantum cryptography system. Nature communications, 2:349, 2011.
[26] Ilja Gerhardt, Qin Liu, Anta Lamas-Linares, Johannes Skaar, Valerio Scarani,
Vadim Makarov, and Christian Kurtsiefer. Experimentally faking the violation
of Bell's inequalities. Physical Review Letters, 107(17):170404, 2011.
[27] Zoltan Gingl and Robert Mingesz. Noise properties in the ideal Kirchho-
Law-Johnson-Noise secure communication system. PLoS ONE, 9(4):1{4, 04
2014.
[28] Elias Gonzalez, Robert S. Balog, and Laszlo B. Kish. Resource requirements
and speed versus geometry of unconditionally secure physical key exchanges.
Entropy, 17(4):2010, 2015.
[29] Elias Gonzalez, Robert S. Balog, Robert Mingesz, and Laszlo B. Kish. Un-
conditional security for the smart power grids and star networks. In Noise
and Fluctuations (ICNF), IEEE 2015 International Conference on, pages 1{4,
June 2015.
[30] Elias Gonzalez and Laszlo B. Kish. Key exchange trust evaluation in peer-to-
peer sensor networks with unconditionally secure key exchange. Fluctuation
78
and Noise Letters, 0(0):1650008, 0.
[31] Elias Gonzalez, Laszlo B. Kish, and Robert S. Balog. Encryption key distri-
bution system and method, February 23 2016. US Patent 9,270,448.
[32] Elias Gonzalez, Laszlo B. Kish, Robert S. Balog, and Prasad Enjeti. Informa-
tion theoretically secure, enhanced Johnson noise based key distribution over
the smart grid with switched lters. PLoS ONE, 8(7):1{10, 07 2013.
[33] Tyrone Grandison and Morris Sloman. A survey of trust in internet applica-
tions. IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, 3(4):2{16, Fourth 2000.
[34] Jonathan L. Gross and Jay Yellen. Handbook of graph theory. CRC press: Boca
Raton, FL, USA, 2004.
[35] Daojing He, Chun Chen, Sammy Chan, Jiajun Bu, and Laurence T. Yang.
Security analysis and improvement of a secure and distributed reprogramming
protocol for wireless sensor networks. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Elec-
tronics, 60(11):5348{5354, Nov 2013.
[36] Osamu Hirota. Incompleteness and limit of quantum key distribution theory.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1208.2106, 2012.
[37] Lih-Hsing Hsu and Cheng-Kuan Lin. Graph theory and interconnection net-
works. CRC press: Boca Raton, FL, USA, 2008.
[38] Shu Huang, Rudra Dutta, and George N. Rouskas. Trac grooming in path,
star, and tree networks: complexity, bounds, and algorithms. IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications, 24(4):82, 2006.
[39] Abhishek Jain, Kamal Kant, and Malay R. Tripathy. Security solutions for
wireless sensor networks. In Advanced Computing Communication Technologies
(ACCT), 2012 Second International Conference on, pages 430{433, Jan 2012.
79
[40] Nitin Jain, Christoer Wittmann, Lars Lydersen, Carlos Wiechers, Dominique
Elser, Christoph Marquardt, Vadim Makarov, and Gerd Leuchs. Device cali-
bration impacts security of quantum key distribution. Physical Review Letters,
107(11):110501, 2011.
[41] Audun Jsang. A logic for uncertain probabilities. International Journal of
Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems, 9(03):279{311, 2001.
[42] Audun Jsang, Ross Hayward, and Simon Pope. Trust network analysis with
subjective logic. In Proceedings of the 29th Australasian Computer Science
Conference-Volume 48, pages 85{94. Australian Computer Society, Inc., 2006.
[43] Audun Jsang, Roslan Ismail, and Colin Boyd. A survey of trust and reputation
systems for online service provision. Decision support systems, 43(2):618{644,
2007.
[44] Mladen Kezunovic. Smart fault location for smart grids. IEEE Transactions
on Smart Grid, 2(1):11{22, March 2011.
[45] Sangun Kim and Prasad Enjeti. A new hybrid active power lter (APF) topol-
ogy. Power Electronics, IEEE Transactions on, 17(1):48{54, 2002.
[46] Brooks King-Casas, Damon Tomlin, Cedric Anen, Colin F. Camerer, Steven R.
Quartz, and Read P. Montague. Getting to know you: reputation and trust in
a two-person economic exchange. Science, 308(5718):78{83, 2005.
[47] Laszlo B. Kish. Protection against the Man-In-The-Middle attack for the
Kirchho-Loop-Johnson(-like)-Noise cipher and expansion by voltage-based se-
curity. Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 6(01):L57{L63, 2006.
[48] Laszlo B. Kish. Response to Feng Hao's paper \Kish's key exchange scheme is
insecure". Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 6(04):C37{C41, 2006.
80
[49] Laszlo B. Kish. Totally secure classical communication utilizing Johnson(-like)-
Noise and Kircho's law. Physics Letters A, 352(3):178{182, 2006.
[50] Laszlo B. Kish. Enhanced secure key exchange systems based on the Johnson-
noise scheme. Metrology and Measurement Systems, 20(2):191{204, 2013.
[51] Laszlo B. Kish, Derek Abbott, and Claes G. Granqvist. Critical analysis of
the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the
Kirchho-Law-Johnson-Noise scheme. PLoS ONE, 8(12):1{15, 12 2013.
[52] Laszlo B. Kish, Zoltan Gingl, Robert Mingesz, Gergely Vadai, Janusz Smulko,
and Claes-Goran Granqvist. Analysis of an attenuator artifact in an exper-
imental attack by Gunn-Allison-Abbott against the Kirchho-Law-Johnson-
Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. Fluctuation and Noise Letters,
14(01):1550011, 2015.
[53] Laszlo B. Kish and Claes G. Granqvist. Elimination of a Second-Law-Attack,
and all Cable-Resistance-Based Attacks, in the Kirchho-Law-Johnson-Noise
(KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System. Entropy, 16(10):5223, 2014.
[54] Laszlo B. Kish and Claes G. Granqvist. On the security of the Kirchho-
law{Johnson-noise (KLJN) communicator. Quantum Information Processing,
13(10):2213{2219, 2014.
[55] Laszlo B. Kish and Claes-Goran Granqvist. Enhanced usage of keys obtained
by physical, unconditionally secure distributions. Fluctuation and Noise Let-
ters, 14(02):1550007, 2015.
[56] Laszlo B. Kish and Tamas Horvath. Notes on recent approaches concerning
the Kirchho-law{Johnson-noise-based secure key exchange. Physics Letters
A, 373(32):2858{2868, 2009.
81
[57] Laszlo B. Kish and Chiman Kwan. Physical unclonable function hardware
keys utilizing Kirchho-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange and noise-based
logic. Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 12(03):1350018, 2013.
[58] Laszlo B. Kish and Robert Mingesz. Totally secure classical networks with mul-
tipoint telecloning (teleportation) of classical bits through loops with Johnson-
like noise. Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 6(02):C9{C21, 2006.
[59] Laszlo B. Kish and Olivier Saidi. Unconditionally secure computers, algorithms
and hardware, such as memories, processors, keyboards, ash and hard drives.
Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 8(02):L95{L98, 2008.
[60] Deepa Kundur, Xianyong Feng, Shan Liu, Takis Zourntos, and Karen L. Butler-
Purry. Towards a framework for cyber attack impact analysis of the electric
smart grid. In Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2010 First
IEEE International Conference on, pages 244{249, Oct 2010.
[61] Bernd Lahno. Jahrbuch fur Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie, chapter Is
Trust the Result of Bayesian Learning?, pages 47{68. VS Verlag fur Sozialwis-
senschaften, Wiesbaden, 2004.
[62] Chun-Ta Li, Chi-Yao Weng, and Cheng-Chi Lee. An advanced temporal
credential-based security scheme with mutual authentication and key agree-
ment for wireless sensor networks. Sensors, 13(8):9589, 2013.
[63] Yingbin Liang, Vincent Poor, and Shlomo Shamai. Information theoretic se-
curity. Foundations and Trends in Communications and Information Theory,
5(4{5):355{580, 2009.
[64] Rongxing Lu, Xiaodong Lin, Haojin Zhu, Xiaohui Liang, and Xuemin Shen.
BECAN: a bandwidth-ecient cooperative authentication scheme for ltering
82
injected false data in wireless sensor networks. IEEE Transactions on Parallel
and Distributed Systems, 23(1):32{43, Jan 2012.
[65] Eduard Lucas. Recreations mathematiques, four volumes: Gautheir-villars.
Paris, France (1882/1894), pages 161{197, 1882.
[66] Lars Lydersen, Mohsen K. Akhlaghi, Hamed Majedi, Johannes Skaar, and
Vadim Makarov. Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detec-
tor using tailored bright illumination. New Journal of Physics, 13(11):113042,
2011.
[67] Lars Lydersen, Nitin Jain, Christoer Wittmann, ystein Mary, Johannes
Skaar, Christoph Marquardt, Vadim Makarov, and Gerd Leuchs. Super-
linear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography. Physical Review A,
84(3):032320, 2011.
[68] Lars Lydersen, Vadim Makarov, and Johannes Skaar. Comment on Resilience
of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum
cryptography. Applied physics letters, 99(19), 2011.
[69] Lars Lydersen, Johannes Skaar, and Vadim Makarov. Tailored bright illu-
mination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols. Journal of Modern
Optics, 58(8):680{685, 2011.
[70] Lars Lydersen, Carlos Wiechers, Christoer Wittmann, Dominique Elser, Jo-
hannes Skaar, and Vadim Makarov. Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD.
Nature Photonics, 4(12):801{801, 2010.
[71] Lars Lydersen, Carlos Wiechers, Christoer Wittmann, Dominique Elser, Jo-
hannes Skaar, and Vadim Makarov. Hacking commercial quantum cryptogra-
83
phy systems by tailored bright illumination. Nature photonics, 4(10):686{689,
2010.
[72] Lars Lydersen, Carlos Wiechers, Christoer Wittmann, Dominique Elser, Jo-
hannes Skaar, and Vadim Makarov. Thermal blinding of gated detectors in
quantum cryptography. Optics express, 18(26):27938{27954, 2010.
[73] Vadim Makarov. Controlling passively quenched single photon detectors by
bright light. New Journal of Physics, 11(6):065003, 2009.
[74] Vadim Makarov and Johannes Skaar. Faked states attack using detector e-
ciency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols. Quan-
tum Information & Computation, 8(6):622{635, 2008.
[75] Patrick McDaniel and Stephen McLaughlin. Security and privacy challenges
in the smart grid. IEEE Security Privacy, 7(3):75{77, May 2009.
[76] Koh K. Meng, Dong Fengming, and Tay E. Guan. Introduction to graph theory:
H3 mathematics. World Scientic Hackensack, NJ, USA, 2007.
[77] Robert Mingesz, Laszlo B. Kish, Zoltan Gingl, Claes-Goran Granqvist,
He Wen, Ferdinand Peper, Travis Eubanks, and Gabor Schmera. Uncondi-
tional security by the laws of classical physics. Metrology and Measurement
Systems, 20(1):3{16, 2013.
[78] Robert Mingesz, Zoltan Gingl, and Laszlo B. Kish. Johnson(-like)-Noise-
Kirchho-Loop based secure classical communicator characteristics, for ranges
of two to two thousand kilometers, via model-line. Physics Letters A,
372(7):978{984, 2008.
[79] Robert Mingesz, Gergely Vadai, and Zoltan Gingl. What kind of noise guaran-
tees security for the Kirchho-Law-Johnson-Noise key exchange? Fluctuation
84
and Noise Letters, 13(03):1450021, 2014.
[80] Hero Modares, Rosli Salleh, and Amirhossein Moravejosharieh. Overview of
security issues in wireless sensor networks. In Computational Intelligence,
Modelling and Simulation (CIMSiM), 2011 Third International Conference on,
pages 308{311, Sept 2011.
[81] Miguel Navarro, Tyler W. Davis, German Villalba, Yimei Li, Xiaoyang Zhong,
Newlyn Erratt, Xu Liang, and Yao Liang. Towards long-term multi-hop WSN
deployments for environmental monitoring: an experimental network evalua-
tion. Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks, 3(4):297{330, 2014.
[82] Ferdinand Peper and Laszlo B. Kish. Information networks secured by the laws
of physics. IEICE transactions on communications, 95(5):1501{1507, 2012.
[83] Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, Justin D. Tygar, Victor Wen, and David E.
Culler. SPINS: Security protocols for sensor networks. Wireless networks,
8(5):521{534, 2002.
[84] Srinivasa Prasanna and Srinivasa Rao. An overview of wireless sensor net-
works applications and security. International Journal of Soft Computing and
Engineering (IJSCE), ISSN, pages 2231{2307, 2012.
[85] Amar Rasheed and Rabi N. Mahapatra. The three-tier security scheme in
wireless sensor networks with mobile sinks. IEEE Transactions on Parallel
and Distributed Systems, 23(5):958{965, May 2012.
[86] Mark Rhodes-Ousley. Information security the complete reference. McGraw
Hill Professional, 2013.
[87] Lawrence G. Roberts and Barry D. Wessler. Computer network development
to achieve resource sharing. In Proceedings of the May 5-7, 1970, spring joint
85
computer conference, pages 543{549. ACM, 1970.
[88] Yessica Saez, Xiaolin Cao, Laszlo B. Kish, and Geza Pesti. Securing vehicle
communication systems by the KLJN key exchange protocol. Fluctuation and
Noise Letters, 13(03):1450020, 2014.
[89] Sebastien Sauge, Lars Lydersen, Andrey Anisimov, Johannes Skaar, and Vadim
Makarov. Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright
light. Optics express, 19(23):23590{23600, 2011.
[90] Bruce Schneider. Applied Cryptography: Protocols, algorithms, and source code
in C. John Wiley & Sons, 1996.
[91] Rudiger Schollmeier. A denition of peer-to-peer networking for the classica-
tion of peer-to-peer architectures and applications. In Peer-to-Peer Comput-
ing, 2001. Proceedings. First International Conference on, pages 101{102, Aug
2001.
[92] Shio K. Singh, Mp Singh, and Dharmendra K. Singh. A survey on network
security and attack defense mechanism for wireless sensor networks. Interna-
tional Journal of Computer Trends and Technology, 1(2):9{17, 2011.
[93] Alexander Soifer. The Mathematical Coloring Book: Mathematics of Coloring
and the Colorful Life of its Creators. Springer: New York, NY USA, 2008.
[94] John A. Stankovic. Research directions for the internet of things. IEEE Internet
of Things Journal, 1(1):3{9, Feb 2014.
[95] William T. Tutte. The factorization of linear graphs. Journal of the London
Mathematical Society, 1(2):107{111, 1947.
[96] William T. Tutte. The factors of graphs. Canad. J. Math, 4(3):314{328, 1952.
86
[97] William T. Tutte. Graph Theory. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
UK, 2001.
[98] Carlos Wiechers, Lars Lydersen, Christoer Wittmann, Dominique Elser, Jo-
hannes Skaar, Ch Marquardt, Vadim Makarov, and Gerd Leuchs. After-gate
attack on a quantum cryptosystem. New Journal of Physics, 13(1):013043,
2011.
[99] Yanli Yu, Keqiu Li, Wanlei Zhou, and Ping Li. Trust mechanisms in wireless
sensor networks: Attack analysis and countermeasures. Journal of Network
and computer Applications, 35(3):867{880, 2012.
[100] Horace P. Yuen. On the foundations of quantum key distribution-Reply to
Renner and beyond. arXiv preprint arXiv:1210.2804, 2012.
[101] Horace P. Yuen. Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key
distribution. In SPIE Security+ Defence, pages 88990J{88990J. International
Society for Optics and Photonics, 2013.
87
